Abstract

ABSTRACT This article reexamines the rise and fall of Operation PBFORTUNE by restoring the contributions of its Latin American participants. In 1952, a loose network of Caribbean Basin regimes sought to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz’s democratically-elected government in Guatemala. At the same time, the U.S. government’s State Department and CIA held the same goal. Lobbied by Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza on behalf of Guatemalan counterrevolutionary Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, the Truman Administration inadvertently approved what Caribbean Basin officials interpreted as their own scheme. Although the CIA would be regularly notified of meetings among Latin American actors, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller grew increasingly frustrated as Caribbean Basin officials contacted State Department officials whom Miller intended to keep unaware. When the State Department ended the program, U.S. officials blamed their Latin American counterparts in order to maintain plausible deniability and circumvent any discussions about their respective department’s role in Operation PBFORTUNE.

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