Language, Linguistics and Cognition

Abstract

Experimental research during the last few decades has provided evidence that language is embedded in a mosaic of cognitive functions. An account of how language interfaces with memory, perception, action and control is no longer beyond the scope of linguistics, and can now be seen as part of an explanation of linguistic structure itself. However, although our view of language has changed, linguistic methodology is lagging behind. This chapter is a sustained argument for a diversification of the kinds of evidence applicable to linguistic questions at di↵erent levels of theory, and a defense of the role of linguistics in experimental cognitive science. 1.1 Linguistic methodology and cognitive science At least two conceptual issues are raised by current interactions between linguistics and cognitive science. One is whether the structures and rules described by linguists are cognitively real. There exist several opinions in this regard, that occupy di↵erent positions on the mentalism/anti-mentalism spectrum. At one extreme is cognitive linguistics [ Croft and Cruse, 2004 ] , endorsing both theoretical and methodological mentalism. The former is the idea that linguistic structures are related formally and causally to other mental entities. The latter calls for a revision of traditional linguistic methodology, and emphasizes the role of cognitive data in linguistics. At the opposite side of the spectrum lies formal semantics which, partly inspired by Frege’s anti-psychologistic stance on meaning and thought [ Frege, 1980; Lewis, 1970; Burge, 2005 ] , rejects both versions of mentalism. Somewhere between the two poles is Chomsky’s [ Chomsky, 1965 ] theoretical mentalism, which sees linguistic rules as ultimately residing in the brain of speakers. However, his commitment to the cognitive reality of grammar does not imply a revision of linguistic methodology, which is maintained in its traditional form based on native speakers’ intuitions and the competence/performance distinction. The second problem, in part dependent on the first, is whether experimental data on language acquisition, comprehension and production have any bearing on linguistic theory. On this point too, there is no consensus among linguists. The division between competence and performance has often been used to secure linguistics from experimental evidence of various sorts [ Bunge, 1984 ] , while