Landlord opposition to rent control and the politics of class monopoly rent

Abstract

Housing costs have soared in the United States and beyond in recent years, leading to growing calls for rent control among tenant rights advocates and legislators. This push to enact rent control has been met with substantial opposition by landlord associations, an opposition which is mobilized by long-standing arguments by economists rooted in neo-classical economic principles. The article extends existing criticism of one particular facet of this opposition: the argument that rent control will only worsen any housing crisis as rents increase due to landlords actively reducing supply. We argue that this argument amounts to the pursuit of something that mainstream economists have long ignored or disavowed to counter-act the intended purpose of rent control: class monopoly rent. By drawing on evidence from the statewide rent control legislation passed in Oregon in 2019, we engage with scholarship on the sociology of housing markets and Marxian rent theory to reveal that landlords acting as a collective voice through landlord associations to advance this argument effectively constitutes the discursive deployment of class monopoly power as a political strategy to lobby against tenant rights proponents. As such, we argue that landlords effectively engage in a “politics of class monopoly rent” which functions as a discursive weapon against tenant rights activists and low-income renters otherwise held captive in unaffordable housing markets. We offer this article as a resource for tenant rights activists and legislators who must inevitably confront this opposition in the process of mobilizing rent control legislation.