Land Rights in Rural China: Facts, Fictions and Issues

Even though it is widely recognized that giving farmers more secure land rights may increase agricultural investment, scholars contend that, in the case of China, such a policy might undermine the function of land as a social safety net and, as a consequence, not be sustainable or command broad support. Data from three provinces, one of which had adopted a policy to increase security of tenure in advance of the others, suggest that greater tenure security, especially if combined with transferability of land, had a positive impact on agricultural investment and, within the time frame considered, led neither to an increase in inequality of land distribution nor a reduction in households' ability to cope with exogenous shocks. Household support for more secure property rights is increased by their access to other insurance mechanisms, suggesting some role of land as a safety net. At the same time, past exposure to this type of land right has a much larger impact quantitatively, suggesting that a large part of the resistance to changed property rights arrangements disappears as household familiarity with such rights increases.

When China's leaders launched rural reforms in the late 1970s, they acknowledged the nation's need to modify its commitment to egalitarianism.1 Slogans such as Tt is glorious to be rich!' and 'Some areas will lead; others will follow!' signalled this fundamental shift in ideology. Leaders backed up these exhortations with a series of concrete policy actions ? establishing the Special Economic Zones and implementing the East Coast-first policy, introducing financial reforms, and initiating the rural industrialization movement. In China's version of the 'trickle down' theory, certain core areas were to take the lead in the modernization process and provide models for other areas to later emulate. Adopting strategies that had been employed

The emergence and eventual prevalence of the household responsibility system, which replaces the production team system as the unit of production and income distribution, has brought about dramatic changes in China's rural areas since 1979. This institutional change has resulted in remarkable growth in agricultural productivity.' However, in the literature on collective farms, a theory that is capable of explaining the causes and effects of this change is yet to be developed. The formal theory about collective economies developed so far by Ward, Domar, Sen, Oi and Clayton, Bradley, Maurice and Ferguson, Cameron, Bonin, Chinn, Israelsen, Putterman, and others suggests that the allocation of resources in a collective farm is efficient at least in

Shenggen FanInternational Food Policy Research Institute and Institute of AgriculturalEconomics of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural SciencesLinxiu ZhangCenter for Chinese Agricultural Policy of the Chinese Academy of SciencesXiaobo ZhangInternational Food Policy Research InstituteI. IntroductionChina is one of the few countries in the developing world that has madeprogress in reducing its total number of poor over the past 25 years.

So What If There Is Income Inequality? The Distributive Consequence of Nonfarm Employment in Rural China

Discussions of rural development policy are for the most part focused on the tenurial, institutional, technical, infrastructural, and economic aspects of agricultural development. In contrast, nonfarm activities in agricultural regions receive little attention, and a number of models of agrarian economies with nonfarm activities have even predicted a decline of such activities with agricultural development.' In this paper we show that nonfarm activities in agricultural regions expand quite rapidly in response to agricultural development and merit special attention in the design of rural-and also of urban-development strategies. The poorest groups of the world's rural population include those who depend on nonfarm activities as a source of employment and income. Nonfarm activities also supply a range of goods and services to agriculture and the rural population, contributing to the growth of agricultural output and the improvement in living conditions in rural areas. Finally, the concentration and growth of nonfarm activities in rural towns localizes employment opportunities for people who leave agriculture and acts to stimulate a degree of decentralization of urban growth.

The objective of this paper is to understand the effects of China’s migration on source communities and to discuss their policy implications. We draw from New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory to understand how migration and migrant remittances can relax or tighten market constraints in China’s rural economy. Using simultaneous-equation econometric techniques and household survey data from China, we estimate net, sectorspecific effects of migration on rural household income, focusing on farm production and self-employment. Our econometric findings indicate that the loss of labor to migration has a negative effect on household cropping income in source areas. However, we provide evidence that remittances sent home by migrants positively compensate for this lost-labor effect, contributing to household incomes directly and indirectly by stimulating crop and possibly self-employment production. This finding offers evidence in support of the NELM hypothesis that remittances loosen constraints on production in the imperfect-market environments characterizing rural areas in less developed countries. Taking into account both the multiple effects of migration and the change in household size, participating in migration increases household per-capita income between 14 and 30 percent. Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China China is experiencing the largest peacetime flow of labor out of agriculture ever witnessed in world history (Solinger, 1999; Rozelle et al., 1999). Despite the rapid expansion of labor migration, China’s work force is still disproportionately employed in agriculture compared to other countries at similar levels of per-capita GDP (Taylor and Martin, 2001). Hence, as China’s economy continues to expand, the flow of labor to urban areas will continue and even accelerate (Johnson, 1999). The massive flow of labor away from farms has intensified research interest in China’s migration in recent years. However, as in the broader literature on migration in less developed countries, most recent studies on China’s migration have focused on determining the size and composition of the labor flow, macroeconomic implications of increased migration, and the effects of migration on urban areas (Zhao, 1999; Yang, 1999; 1997). Less emphasis has been placed on researching the effects of migration on the rural communities that migrants leave, even though evidence shows that the rural household in the village of origin is typically the central concern of all those involved in migration– both those who leave and those who stay behind (exceptions include Wang and Zuo, 1999; Bai, 2001). Moreover, the recent increase in migration has left policy makers particularly concerned regarding the way source communities will be affected (MOA, 1999). They are concerned that as labor flows away from farms, food production and crop income will decline, potentially threatening China’s food security. Furthermore, policy makers are concerned about the increasing gap between urban and rural household incomes. If migration exacerbates this gap, some fear that as it grows rural residents eventually will flood cities ill-equipped to absorb them. Others fear that discontent over a rising urban-rural income gap could even spill over into political unrest (Yang, 1999). Because China’s markets and other modern economic institutions are still relatively undeveloped, migration may play a pivotal role in creating or overcoming constraints caused by the lack of well-functioning markets and/or institutions (Knight and Song, 1999; Benjamin and Brandt, 2000). The “new economics of labor migration” (NELM) literature analyzes migration as a household decision rather than as an individual decision (Stark, 1991). The NELM hypothesizes that rural households facing imperfect market environments decide

PRICE or rent control is but one of many forms of legislative action which interfere with private contracting in the market place. To delimit the scope of my analysis, I shall use the term "price control" to refer only to any set of regulations which satisfies the following three conditions. First, the control must fix the price (or income)' terms of private contracts; this categorically excludes any laws which regulate the distribution of income among the contracting parties on a share or percentage basis.2 Second, the control must involve no appropriation of proceeds to or from the government; taxation and subsidization are thus excluded. Finally, the fixing of price must not be associated with direct government sales, purchases, or manipulation of resources so as to maintain the regulated price;3 by this stipulation, price "support" is also excluded. Even on such terms, legal regulations to control price are still many and varied. To evaluate our understanding of the class of phenomena which we seek to explain it is essential that we discover implications refutable by facts. By this criterion the available body of economic theory pertaining to price control is deficient indeed: the massive literature on the subject offers few such implications.4 An alternative approach to analyzing the observable effects of price control is presented here.

D ISCUSSIONS of the efficiency of various systems of land tenure are marred by all sorts of imprecision in analysis. Economists have developed a clear notion of economic efficiency but discussions of land tenure invariably bring in some sociological and wealth-distribution constraints when discussing the efficiency aspects of tenure systems. Social anthropologists and others stress that certain tenure systems are integral parts of social systems involving such things as insurance for old and young, with the implication that even though these tenure systems might not facilitate (pecuniary) wealthmaximization, yet the non-pecuniary wealth facilitated provides "enough" compensation in some general welfare sense. I shall discard such sociological arguments because I believe that there is no reason why the sociological benefits of particular tenure systems cannot be obtained by some alternative arrangement while creating a tenure system that is designed to facilitate wealth maximization and wealth increases.

As one of the last agricultural frontiers of the humid tropics, Amazonia is the largest area of the world currently undergoing frontier settlement. Although the earliest intrusions of foreign populations into Amazonia date from pre-Hispanic times, the large-scale entrance of peasant colonists into the vast region is a recent phenomenon. Much of this movement represents the spontaneous migration of peoples, but governments in the region have also become increasingly interested in opening up and integrating Amazonia to national and international economies. These actions are frequently seen as potential solutions to a number of national problems, including the need to increase agricultural production, correct spatial imbalances in the distribution of population, exploit frontier lands for reasons of national security, and defuse potentially serious political problems resulting from the existing agrarian structure, landlessness, and unemployment. The upper basin of the Amazon in Ecuador, bordering on the eastern slopes of the Andes, is one such area of frontier settlement. Recent decades have witnessed the rapid conversion of these Amazonian forests to agricultural uses through a series of schemes bearing such labels as land development and colonization. Most forest intervention in the region has come at the hands of colonist farmers attempting to establish land claims along transport routes originally constructed to aid in petroleum exploration and exploitation. These are farmers who formerly have made a living in long-established farmlands and who, for various reasons (population pressures, pervasive poverty, maldistribution of farmland, lack of inputs for intensive cultivation, lack of nonagrarian livelihood opportunities, and generally inadequate rural development) have been increasingly squeezed out of their homelands. A marginal person by virtue of his low socioeconomic and political status, the farmer often perceives

Previous articleNext article No AccessChoice of Land Tenure in China: The Case of a County with Quasi‐Private Property Rights*James Kai‐sing KungJames Kai‐sing KungHong Kong University of Science and Technology Search for more articles by this author Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Economic Development and Cultural Change Volume 50, Number 4July 2002 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/343135 Views: 138Total views on this site Citations: 29Citations are reported from Crossref © 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Lawrence W.C. LAI, Stephen N.G. DAVIES, K.W. CHAU, Lennon H.T. CHOY, Mark H. CHUA, Terry K.W. 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Homesteading and Property Rights; Or, "How the West Was Really Won"

Purpose Economic reforms in rural China have led to the emergence of land and labor markets. The development of rural land rental markets can improve agricultural productivity and equity by facilitating transfers of land to more productive farmers and facilitating the participation in the non-farm economy of less productive farmers. In contrast to the burgeoning development of off-farm labor markets, the development of rural land rental market has lagged. The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors affecting households’ entry and transaction intensity in rural land rental markets, especially the effects of land tenure and off-farm employment. Design/methodology/approach Based on a field survey data of 479 household in Henan Province in 2009, the authors used Cragg’s double hurdle model to identify the determinants for households’ land rental participation and its transaction amount. Findings Off-farm employment is one of main driving factor for household’s land rent-out decision. Tenure insecurity reduces both the propensity and the magnitude of rental market transactions. Land use certificates significantly contribute to participation in land-rental markets and the rental amount. Originality/value This paper treats household land rental market participation as a related two-step process, focusing on both land transfer and its transaction amount. This paper also builds on a broad view, including analysis on both demand and supply side of land rental market.

The Problem of Social Cost

In what forms are agribusinesses entering agriculture and interacting with farmers? How are land, labor and capital now controlled by corporate and individual actors, and then organized into agricultural production? How does such control and organization shape the relationships between the actors? In this article we argue that agrarian capitalism is expanding in China. The means of production, such as capital and land, are increasingly controlled by agribusiness, while direct producers increasingly sell their labor for a living. We document various forms in which agribusiness companies are conducting transactions with individual agricultural producers. We also argue that China's unique system of land rights featuring collective ownership but individualized usage rights has acted as a powerful force in shaping interactions between agribusiness and direct producers. It provides farmers with a source of economic income and political bargaining power, and restricts corporate actors from dispossessing farmers of their land. We find strong norms protecting farmers' collective land rights in the agricultural sector, contrary to the received wisdom about weak protection of land rights in China. In the rest of the paper, we first review the policy context in which this transformation has taken place. Next we introduce our method of data collection, summarize the five forms of agribusiness-farmer interaction found in our study, and analyze each of the five forms in depth. We conclude with a discussion of the causes and characteristics of the rise of agrarian capitalism, with a focus on the role of the land rights system.