Reforms, Investment, and Poverty in Rural China

When China's leaders launched rural reforms in the late 1970s, they acknowledged the nation's need to modify its commitment to egalitarianism.1 Slogans such as Tt is glorious to be rich!' and 'Some areas will lead; others will follow!' signalled this fundamental shift in ideology. Leaders backed up these exhortations with a series of concrete policy actions ? establishing the Special Economic Zones and implementing the East Coast-first policy, introducing financial reforms, and initiating the rural industrialization movement. In China's version of the 'trickle down' theory, certain core areas were to take the lead in the modernization process and provide models for other areas to later emulate. Adopting strategies that had been employed

The flood of economic information from China in recent years has permitted reassessment of the "Chinese model of development" and the extent to which China's own development experience has conformed to it. The prevailing consensus of the 1970s concerning the substance of the model itself-typically characterized in terms of the Chinese leadership's objectives and priorities and its strategy for pursuing them-has stood up quite well. The same cannot be said about past appraisals of the extent to which China's economic reality has been reshaped to accord with the model's prescriptions. One of the most widely remarked elements of the Chinese model is the high priority assigned to regional objectives and, more specifically, to "balance" in the distribution of productive capacity and equity in the distribution of income and, hence, consumption. During the Maoist era (i.e., prior to 1979), the central government pursued regional objectives through such measures as interregional transfers of investment resources (effected via the planning system), subsidization of health and education expenditures in poor regions, and attempts to maintain a safety net of state relief (effected largely via control of grain surpluses). In short, there is little doubt that prior to 1979 the Chinese leadership placed an unusually high value on the spread of modern growth and the improvements in welfare associated with it and persistently acted to limit the emergence or widening of interregional disparities.' Although China's post-Mao leaders have shown greater concern with efficiency and with the potential trade-offs between efficiency and such goals as balance and equity, their continuation of many redistributive policies indicates that they have not abandoned regional objectives. But how successful has China been in achieving these objectives?

The emergence and eventual prevalence of the household responsibility system, which replaces the production team system as the unit of production and income distribution, has brought about dramatic changes in China's rural areas since 1979. This institutional change has resulted in remarkable growth in agricultural productivity.' However, in the literature on collective farms, a theory that is capable of explaining the causes and effects of this change is yet to be developed. The formal theory about collective economies developed so far by Ward, Domar, Sen, Oi and Clayton, Bradley, Maurice and Ferguson, Cameron, Bonin, Chinn, Israelsen, Putterman, and others suggests that the allocation of resources in a collective farm is efficient at least in

A salient theme in D. Gale Johnson’s work is the importance of agricultural development for general prosperity and for economic diversification (e.g., Johnson 2000). Johnson has also noted that most of the world’s poor are engaged in farming, so that a key focus of development policy is to raise the incomes of farmers. From a global perspective, increasing the productivity of agriculture, given the fixity of land, is necessary for both poverty reduction and the development of the nonagricultural sector. At the level of the world, agricultural productivity gains, poverty reduction, and the growth of the nonfarm sector are complements. However, the question remains whether these observations imply that every poor country should focus its public resources on agricultural development in order to raise the incomes of people now engaged in farming and whether such a policy is necessary for obtaining economic diversity. In this article, we use the experience of India over the past 30 years to address the issue of whether agricultural technical change actually leads to economic diversification and income growth within the rural sector in the context of an open-economy country in which there are cross-area trade and capital flows. We focus in particular on the rural sector because this is the sector in which linkages between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors are thought to be the strongest. We exploit the fact that India has maintained a policy of openness with respect to agricultural technology over this period, permitting and actively supporting agricultural development, and has moved to a reformed regime in which goods are traded and capital is more mobile in the 1990s. Evidence on the relationship between agricultural growth and nonfarm

So What If There Is Income Inequality? The Distributive Consequence of Nonfarm Employment in Rural China

Even though it is widely recognized that giving farmers more secure land rights may increase agricultural investment, scholars contend that, in the case of China, such a policy might undermine the function of land as a social safety net and, as a consequence, not be sustainable or command broad support. Data from three provinces, one of which had adopted a policy to increase security of tenure in advance of the others, suggest that greater tenure security, especially if combined with transferability of land, had a positive impact on agricultural investment and, within the time frame considered, led neither to an increase in inequality of land distribution nor a reduction in households' ability to cope with exogenous shocks. Household support for more secure property rights is increased by their access to other insurance mechanisms, suggesting some role of land as a safety net. At the same time, past exposure to this type of land right has a much larger impact quantitatively, suggesting that a large part of the resistance to changed property rights arrangements disappears as household familiarity with such rights increases.

China's rural economic reforms radically altered land tenure in rural China. With the granting of land use rights and residual income rights to farming households between 1979 and 1983, agriculture shifted from a collective-based to a familybased system. Land was not privatized, however. Ownership remained "collective", with local officials, typically at the village level, exercising a major influence over the allocation of land and the way households could use land. The initial land allocations to families were typically based on household size, household labour supply, or both. The central government's policy was that these allocations were supposed to be for 15 years. In some villages, land use contracts have been respected; in other villages, however, local leaders have periodically redistributed land among households and have intervened throughout the reform period to determine how farmers are able to use the land. The initial reforms triggered an unprecedented acceleration of agricultural growth in China. From 1979 to 1984, the gross value of agricultural output increased in real terms at an annual rate of 7.6 per cent, and grain production rose by 4.9 per cent annually.' Empirical studies attribute a significant part of this increase to enhanced incentives, as farmers were able to keep the output and

Aggregate estimates of food expenditure are consistent with such a possibility, implying income/expenditure elasticities close to one. However, the high degree of aggregation at which such estimates are made means that the considerable increase in price per nutrient as income increases is ignored, and the nutrient elasticities are therefore overstated. Estimates for a rural south Indian sample indicate that this bias is considerable and that the true nutrient elasticities with respect to income may be close to zero.

The objective of this paper is to understand the effects of China’s migration on source communities and to discuss their policy implications. We draw from New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory to understand how migration and migrant remittances can relax or tighten market constraints in China’s rural economy. Using simultaneous-equation econometric techniques and household survey data from China, we estimate net, sectorspecific effects of migration on rural household income, focusing on farm production and self-employment. Our econometric findings indicate that the loss of labor to migration has a negative effect on household cropping income in source areas. However, we provide evidence that remittances sent home by migrants positively compensate for this lost-labor effect, contributing to household incomes directly and indirectly by stimulating crop and possibly self-employment production. This finding offers evidence in support of the NELM hypothesis that remittances loosen constraints on production in the imperfect-market environments characterizing rural areas in less developed countries. Taking into account both the multiple effects of migration and the change in household size, participating in migration increases household per-capita income between 14 and 30 percent. Migration and Incomes in Source Communities: A New Economics of Migration Perspective from China China is experiencing the largest peacetime flow of labor out of agriculture ever witnessed in world history (Solinger, 1999; Rozelle et al., 1999). Despite the rapid expansion of labor migration, China’s work force is still disproportionately employed in agriculture compared to other countries at similar levels of per-capita GDP (Taylor and Martin, 2001). Hence, as China’s economy continues to expand, the flow of labor to urban areas will continue and even accelerate (Johnson, 1999). The massive flow of labor away from farms has intensified research interest in China’s migration in recent years. However, as in the broader literature on migration in less developed countries, most recent studies on China’s migration have focused on determining the size and composition of the labor flow, macroeconomic implications of increased migration, and the effects of migration on urban areas (Zhao, 1999; Yang, 1999; 1997). Less emphasis has been placed on researching the effects of migration on the rural communities that migrants leave, even though evidence shows that the rural household in the village of origin is typically the central concern of all those involved in migration– both those who leave and those who stay behind (exceptions include Wang and Zuo, 1999; Bai, 2001). Moreover, the recent increase in migration has left policy makers particularly concerned regarding the way source communities will be affected (MOA, 1999). They are concerned that as labor flows away from farms, food production and crop income will decline, potentially threatening China’s food security. Furthermore, policy makers are concerned about the increasing gap between urban and rural household incomes. If migration exacerbates this gap, some fear that as it grows rural residents eventually will flood cities ill-equipped to absorb them. Others fear that discontent over a rising urban-rural income gap could even spill over into political unrest (Yang, 1999). Because China’s markets and other modern economic institutions are still relatively undeveloped, migration may play a pivotal role in creating or overcoming constraints caused by the lack of well-functioning markets and/or institutions (Knight and Song, 1999; Benjamin and Brandt, 2000). The “new economics of labor migration” (NELM) literature analyzes migration as a household decision rather than as an individual decision (Stark, 1991). The NELM hypothesizes that rural households facing imperfect market environments decide

In China, as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, economic reform initiatives seek to increase productivity by introducing elements of market-oriented policies and institutions into an economy formerly dominated by state planning. Efforts to evaluate the impact of reform of Chinese industry have focused on the measurement of productivity change in state enterprises. This study expands the prior framework of analysis in several directions. Our investigation of productivity trends is not limited to state enterprises but includes quantitative comparisons with China's fast-growing collective industries, which contributed 36% of overall industrial output in 1988.1 Unlike previous studies, our analysis works with gross rather than net output. This permits us to investigate changes in the productivity of intermediate inputs, which occupy a large portion of total costs in Chinese industry, as well as labor and capital. To do this, we develop a "quasi-frontier" estimation procedure which seems appropriate for comparisons of total factor productivity based on Chinese industrial data. Finally, we offer a quantitative perspective on the extent to which reform efforts have moved industrial resource allocation toward patterns expected of a market system. The analysis confirms our previous finding, based on a restricted framework employing only labor, fixed capital, and net output, that multifactor productivity in state industry has risen substantially during

Development strategies increasingly emphasize agricultural development, employment, and equity; it is therefore important to examine the role of education in light of these new emphases. The purpose of this paper is to synthesize the conclusions of a number of studies of the effect of a farmer's educational level and exposure to extension services on his productivity. Eighteen studies conducted in low-income countries provided 37 sets of farm data that allow a statistical estimation of the effect of education. The overall conclusion of this paper is that farm productivity increases as a result of a farmer's completing at least 4 additional years of elementary education rather than none. Also, the effects of education were much more likely to be positive in modernizing agricultural environments than in traditional ones.

Nonfarm Activities and Household Production Choices in Smallholder Agriculture in Vietnam

This study contributes to the literature on the impact of farmer contact with agricultural extension services on farm productivity, drawing on a unique panel sample of households residing in three resettlement areas of rural Zimbabwe. It pays particular attention to the potential confounding effects of the biases identified by Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder. Specifically, we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data to estimate the impact of extension on the value of crop production per hectare, with and without controls for unobservable household fixed effects. The attraction of this estimator is that the differencing process rids the specification of the correlation between extension and the disturbance term. We find that after controlling for innate productivity characteristics and farmers' ability using household fixed- effects estimation, access to agricultural extension services, defined as receiving one or two visits per agricultural year, raises the value of crop production by about 15%. This parameter estimate is statistically significant. Another unique feature of these data are, for a subsample, extension worker assessments of farmers' ability. We find that farmers with above-average ability are indeed more productive, producing 40%-50% higher output per hectare of cropped area. Controlling for innate productivity using locality dummies, farm plot characteristics, and farmers' ability using these assessments of ability, we continue to obtain a positive association between access to extension and productivity, an association that is equal in magnitude to our fixed-effects results. However, we also find considerable variability in these parameter estimates across individual crop years.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to study the long‐run relationship between economic growth and income inequality in China during the pre‐reform (1952‐1978) and post‐reform (1979‐2007) periods, this will be done via cointegration analysis.Design/methodology/approachThe aim of this paper is to offer a proper answer to the issue of the inequality‐growth nexus by using a cointegrated VAR‐setting approach, in this way, the study can cope and avoid the problems of parameter heterogeneneity, omitted variable bias and endogeneity, from which the model of macroeconometric analysis suffers.FindingsThe cointegration analysis shows that, for both periods the relationship is positive and the inequality‐growth elasticity has grown in the second period. In addition, a more robust test of Granger‐causality suggested by Toda and Yamamoto indicates that whereas in the first period there is unidirectional causality from inequality to growth, there is no directional causality in the second period.Practical implicationsThe pre‐reform period going from 1952 to 1978 is characterized by the adoption and implementation of a Soviet‐type economy. The economy showed a modest annual economic growth rate of 2.33 percent and very low levels of inequality, with an average Gini coefficient of 0.27. The post‐reform period tried to combine central planning with market‐oriented reforms to increase productivity. In fact, the economy has grown at an annual growth rate of 7.07 percent since 1979 and also the inequality with an average Gini coefficient of 0.33.Originality/valueThe paper studies the relationship between income inequality and economic growth in China during the pre and post reform periods. A significant and positive long‐run relationship between inequality and economic growth in both periods was found. The inequality‐growth elasticity is greater in the post‐reform than the pre‐reform period. Using a more robust Granger causality test the authors find a unidirectional predetermination between the variables for the whole period and for the pre‐reform period. However, there is not causality in the post‐reform period. Except the urban‐rural disparity which explains the unidirectional causality from inequality to growth, pre‐reform China was basically an egalitarian society. In the pre‐reform period, the low inequality was identified as a strain on economic growth. However, the reform period has seen remarkable growth. Although regional inequality and the rural‐urban gap declined from the late 1970s to the mid‐1980s, both have increased rather dramatically since the mid‐1980s.

This study aims to investigate the sources of income inequality in rural China. The regression-based decomposition approach is employed to measure the relative contribution of each determinant to net income of rural residents in China. The analysis is based on a unique database of financial development compiled at the county level. This study contributes to the literature on income inequality in China by filling a gap in existing literature which is based mainly on provincial and survey data. The results clearly reveal that financial development, industrialization, the development of the tertiary sector and employment are important income determinants and contributors of intercounty inequality in rural China. The findings may provide valuable information for combating inequality in the years ahead.