Abstract
The essay discusses a central problem of modern moral philosophy: «Is it possible to argue rationally about good life?». Kantian ethics, of which Habermas is the main exponent, gives a negative answer to this question, limiting the sphere of moral philosophy to that of «right». Habermas conceives «good» and «values» in a subjectivistic way, putting them beyond the reach of rational reasoning. Anyhow it is possible to argue instead that values are transcendent with respect to the subject (Ricoeur, Joas, Taylor), and that consequently it does exist a form of «practical reeasoning» which, while not linked to abstract universalism, it is a learning process internal to values themselves (Taylor). The general meaning of this critique to Habermas is not to reject deontological universalistic ethic, but to define the relationships between good and right without giving up the rationality this ethics purports.
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