La vente en primeur, un substitut au crédit bancaire

Abstract

This article focuses on the role of “ en primeur” market in financing wine producers facing liquidity problems. “ En primeur” market is a kind of wine forward market specific to the Bordeaux region. It occurs every spring after the grape harvest while the wine is still in barrel. Wine is bottled and delivered one to two years later. A producer’s loan repayment capacity depends on the wine future value i. e. the price of the wine when it is bottled. The existence of an information asymmetry between the banks and the producer about the quality of the wine creates a credit rationing problem in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1984). To address this issue we propose an adverse selection model whereby a producer needs to raise funds to finance a project. He can apply for a bank loan and/ or sell “ primeur” wine to a trader. The purchase of “ primeur” wine by a trader can also act as a certification mechanism for the future value of the wine. Our analysis shows that when trader’s information is completely revealed, the credit rationing problem is solved. However, because of the nature of the traded good, certification is not robust to collusion between the trader and the producer. Finally, we show that “ en primeur” sales are only used for financing needs after grape harvest.