Abstract

Resumen: Los críticos del positivismo legalista en la transición del siglo XIX al XX -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- enfrentaron una concepción plural del derecho a la ley como única fuente formal del derecho y al Estado como una única fuente material del derecho. La semejanza de estos críticos y el derecho indígena en general -y en particular el derecho indígena zapatista- es asombrosa tanto en lo que respecta a la defensa de una pluralidad de normas como a la génesis y formación histórica de las mismas.
 Abstract: The critics of legalistic positivism in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- were opposed to a plural conception of the law to the law as the only formal source and the state as a only material source of law. The similarity between these critics and indigenous law in general -and indigenous zapatista law in particular- is amazing as much in respect to the defense of a plurality of rules as to their origin and historical development.
 
 
 ABSTRACT: The critics of legalistic positivism in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries -Gény, Ehrlich, Kantorowiz- were opposed to a plural conception of the law to the law as the only formal source and the state as a only material source of law. The similarity between these critics and indigenous law in general -and indigenous zapatista law in particular- is amazing as much in respect to the defense of a plurality of rules as to their origin and historical development.

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