Abstract
In psychology and philosophy of mind, the problem of knowledge of other minds is a field of rich disputes. Running counter to the perspectives of first- and third-person mental attribution, which assume that minds are opaque and that access to them is inferential, the second-person perspective postulates the existence of a non-representational way of knowing other minds, which is presumed to emerge within early communicative exchanges in the form of natural, basic, and direct emotional involvement. In this systematic review article, 57 philosophy or psychology manuscripts were selected with the aim of analyzing and comparing them. This study makes it possible to assess: (a) the current status of the second person perspective, (b) its main findings in developmental psychology and psychopathology, (c) the methodological discussions that stem from its assumption, and (d) a set of internal and external criticisms and questions formulated with respect to it. It is concluded that the second person perspective has a heuristic value and would be remarkably enriched if it carefully addressed the criticisms leveled against it.
Highlights
En psicología y filosofía de la mente el problema del conocimiento de las otras mentes es un campo de ricas disputas
In psychology and philosophy of mind, the problem of knowledge of other minds is a field of rich disputes
Running counter to the perspectives of first- and third-person mental attribution, which assume that minds are opaque and that access to them is inferential, the second-person perspective postulates the existence of a non-representational way of knowing other minds, which is presumed to emerge within early communicative exchanges in the form of natural, basic, and direct emotional involvement
Summary
En psicología y filosofía de la mente el problema del conocimiento de las otras mentes es un campo de ricas disputas. Este trabajo permite justipreciar: (a) el estado actual de la perspectiva de segunda persona, (b) sus principales hallazgos en psicología y psicopatología del desarrollo, (c) las discusiones metodológicas que se derivan de su asunción y (d) un conjunto de críticas y cuestionamientos internos y externos formulados hacia ella. Una de las principales críticas que se ha esgrimido en contra de ellas es que para explicar la atribución mentalista ambas parten considerando a los sujetos como individuos aislados, solipsistas. En esta revisión privilegiamos el análisis de literatura psicológica, aunque también desarrollamos brevemente algunos aportes asociados a la filosofía de la mente, dada la importancia que estos últimos importan para el estudio de la cognición social. Esta discrepancia teórico/metodológica tornaría forzada su comparación
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