Abstract

ABSTRACTOver the last few years, the idea that some of the central problems of Latin American development are a consequence of the excessive power of the elites has regained influence. Nevertheless, this neoinstitutionalist approach has been criticized because of its excessive determinism and the fact that it doesn’t pay enough attention to the periods when elite’s power was eroded. The present paper analyzes one of these cases, which occurred in Chile between 1913 and 1973. The income share of the top 1% is used as a proxy for the elite’s power. New quantitative evidence on incomes for different groups –the 1% and wage earners– is integrated into an analytic narrative on the conflictive relation between the elite and other political and social actors.

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