La clinique au cas par cas. Réflexion sur l’épistémologie de John Forrester

Abstract

ObjectiveIn this article, I analyse John Forrester's conception of the case. I investigate both his arguments in favor of the specific epistemological dignity of this type of reasoning, and the concrete description that he gives through a few psychoanalytic examples. I then question his method and point out the limits of his reflection, by underlining certain critical objections. MethodMy method consists in an examination of Forrester's presuppositions, in the light of the research of other authors concerning the notion of clinical rationality. In particular, I analyze Forrester's definition of psychoanalysis as a science of the individual, by questioning the difference between the notions of individual and singular. I also investigate the scientific legitimacy of generalizing from a single case, the nature of casuistic (vs. abductive) inference, and finally the opposition between the quantitative and the qualitative in social and human sciences. ResultsIf the notion of case must be defended in social and human sciences, it is not for the reasons given by Forrester. A better justification is to be found in the different nature and properties of formal and natural symbolisms: because of their use of discourse, social sciences are compelled to invent theoretical concepts that are always linked to singular historical contexts. DiscussionsAs a consequence, I give Forrester credit for having promoted the theoretical (not only practical, like Flyvbjerg) value of casuistry. But I challenge his hypothesis, according to which thinking by case would be a “style” of knowledge cutting across all disciplines. Indeed, I claim that its specificity should be limited to human and social sciences (including psychoanalysis).