Abstract
This paper wants to carry out an analytical description of the use of Greek mercenaries in the East, from King’s Peace of 386 BC. In a new international world-system based on multilateral relations, Athens employed a shadow force of mercenaries in order to support the enemies of its allied powers, no matter if they were Sparta or Persia. Taking this example into mind, the radical improvements in war strategy along the IV century, as well as the high complexity of the international relations in the East, made such soldiers become an essential tool for any Ancient state with hegemonic aspirations.
Highlights
This paper wants to carry out an analytical description of the use of Greek mercenaries in the East, from King’s Peace of 386 BC
In a new international world-system based on multilateral relations, Athens employed a shadow force of mercenaries in order to support the enemies of its allied powers, no matter if they were Sparta or Persia
Taking this example into mind, the radical improvements in war strategy along the IV century, as well as the high complexity of the international relations in the East, made such soldiers become an essential tool for any Ancient state with hegemonic aspirations
Summary
La revuelta de Ciro (401) otorgó a los gobernantes antipersas de Egipto una nueva oportunidad para intentar sacudirse definitivamente el yugo aqueménida, tratando así de finalizar el proceso iniciado por Amirteo, quien, aprovechando la muerte del rey Darío II en 404 promovió una revuelta que desplazó del poder a la etno-clase filopersa dominante (Briant, 1988: 137). Como sugeríamos más arriba, esta debilidad política persa habría aumentado durante la crisis provocada por Ciro el Joven y, al final, ésta pudiera haber sido la causa de la degradación y hundimiento del dominio aqueménida en Egipto entre el 404 y el 399 (Briant, 1988: 150). Una vez desarticulado el frente griego, Artajerjes esgrimió como casus belli la subyugación de sus súbditos en las ciudades fenicias de la isla (D.S., XIV, 8) y, de esta forma, el rey de Salamina de Chipre no tuvo más opción que aliarse con los enemigos del Gran Rey (fundamentalmente Ácoris de Egipto) para tratar de frenar la maquinaria de guerra aqueménida (D.S. XV, 29, 1)
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