La astucia en la conceptualización platónica de σοφία

Abstract

Considering the importance of cunning in the characterization of σοφία in the Ancient Greek tradition, from the literature of the archaic period to the Socratic circle, it is striking that in Plato there is no such thing as a cunning σοφός. Apart from the Lesser Hippias, which offers an ambiguous assessment of Odysseus πολυτροπία, the σοφός is almost never defined by its intelligence —this is not a distinctive feature of the σοφός or φιλόσοφος— but rather by the knowledge of certain things. The lack of treatment has led to most interpreters to neglect the subject. In order to remedy this situation, in this article I offer an interpretation that diagnoses the absence of an attribute such as cunning in the conceptualization of σοφία in Plato, but not as the result of simple condemnation or censorship as argued, for example, by Detienne and Vernant 1978 and suggested by Montiglio 2011. In this paper I propose that Plato would manifest a lack of interest regarding these attributes. From the analysis of the Platonic corpus I seek to demonstrate that, although attributes of intelligence are considered advantageous and desirable qualities, the have only instrumental value with respect to the attainment of truth and good.