ANCIENT CHINESE AND ANCIENT GREEK PERCEPTION OF TEMPORALITY: COMPARATIVE ASPECT AND CONNECTION WITH MODERNITY

In ancient Greece and ancient China, small states engaged in intense military competition and incessant warfare. In such contexts, there was naturally much emphasis on the training of soldiers. One might have expected state-sponsored physical education to develop as a by-product of the need to train soldiers, but the historical record shows that ancient Greek states placed far more emphasis on physical education compared to their counterparts in ancient China. This essay attempts to (partly) explain the divergent outcomes with reference to the idea of citizenship. The first part outlines the practice and philosophy of state-sponsored physical education in ancient Greece and ancient China and addresses the question of why the two ancient civilizations should be compared in this respect. The main body of the article discusses the political differences between ancient Greece and ancient China that help to explain the different outcomes regarding state-sponsored physical education. The last part ends with some normative reflections that may be relevant for present-day societies.

It is well known in 21st century historiography, where increasingly specific points are being studied. There are unquestionably several reasons why historians prefer micro titles. At this point, it does not seem possible to deal with the confusion between people and events with macro-historiography. The fact that the historian makes a balls-up more solvable, which he deals with, depends on the limitation of the problem and making it micro as much as possible. When ancient and modern historiographies are compared, it is likely to find many common traits between them in this regard. The writing of gods and goddesses, the lives of emperors, and certain titles in ancient civilizations are micro titles. For instance, there are gods and goddesses in the center of Mesopotamian historiography. In ancient Greece, history begins with the writing of Legends. Documents describing dynasties in ancient China are also examples of micro-history. Probably, this was the reason of the explanation of micro subjects for the understanding of ancient history. It is obvious that the goal was more than the life story of that person. The intent to reach a macro perspective and generalization with a micro title addressed is the same as the effort of the modern historian. In consequence, it is exciting to see that those who know the smallest part, the ‘one', can understand and make sense of the whole and thus the chain of events that appear untidy is regular.

We introduce temporal flows on temporal networks [17, 19], i.e., networks the links of which exist only at certain moments of time. Such networks are ephemeral in the sense that no link exists after some time. Our flow model is new and differs from the “flows over time” model, also called “dynamic flows” in the literature. We show that the problem of finding the maximum amount of flow that can pass from a source vertex \({s}\) to a sink vertex \({t}\) up to a given time is solvable in Polynomial time, even when node buffers are bounded. We then examine mainly the case of unbounded node buffers. We provide a simplified static Time-Extended network (\(\mathrm {STEG}\)), which is of polynomial size to the input and whose static flow rates are equivalent to the respective temporal flow of the temporal network; using \(\mathrm {STEG}\), we prove that the maximum temporal flow is equal to the minimum temporal \({s}\text {-}{t}\) cut. We further show that temporal flows can always be decomposed into flows, each of which moves only through a journey, i.e., a directed path whose successive edges have strictly increasing moments of existence. We partially characterise networks with random edge availabilities that tend to eliminate the \({s}\rightarrow {t}\) temporal flow. We then consider mixed temporal networks, which have some edges with specified availabilities and some edges with random availabilities; we show that it is #P-hard to compute the tails and expectations of the maximum temporal flow (which is now a random variable) in a mixed temporal network.

Temporal flows in temporal networks

Mozi (fl. ca. 430 BCE ) was the charismatic founder of an influential philosophical, political, and religious movement that flourished during the Warring States era (479–221 BCE ) in ancient China. Arguably the first real philosopher in the Chinese tradition, Mozi initiated the practice of ethical argumentation in China. He was the first figure to undertake – as Socrates did in ancient Greece – an explicit, reflective search for objective moral criteria and to support his views with tightly constructed arguments. He and his followers – the Mohists ( Mo zhe ) – developed a systematic set of ethical, political, and epistemological doctrines that included history's earliest version of a consequentialist ethical theory ( see Consequentialism), a state of nature argument for the existence of government, and an inchoate just war theory ( see Just War Theory, History of). The Mohists played a pivotal role in shaping the central concepts, premises, and issues of classical Chinese ethics, political theory, epistemology, philosophy of language, and logic (Graham 1978, 1989; Hansen 1992). They also contributed to early Chinese science and mathematics. The Mohist movement continued for two to three centuries after Mozi's death before eventually fading away during the Western Han dynasty (206 BCE –8 CE ).

From Rivers to Confetti: Reconfigurations of Time through New Media Narratives

Meter and Performance

China is one of the most ancient civilizations of mankind. Ancient Chinese art and culture have deep spiritual traditions that arose from the fusion of various ethno-cultural values. The art and culture of ancient China are rightfully considered one of the most striking and unique phenomena in the history of human civilization. Since the fifth millennium, the first agricultural centers have appeared in ancient China. It should be noted that the very first mythological and cosmological worldviews of ancient China are connected with the ancient Chinese agricultural culture. Geometric and floral ornaments, zoomorphic and anthropomorphic images that adorn ancient Chinese ceramics of the Neolithic era reflect the myths and rituals of the ancient Chinese. In the middle of the II millennium BC, the Yin civilization was formed in the Yellow River basin. The Yin period in the history of ancient Chinese culture marks a huge progress in many areas of ancient Chinese society. It is also noteworthy that in the decorative and applied art of ancient China of the Yin period, completely new and different art products with elements and motifs of the "animal" style appear in their forms and compositional content. Many researchers believe that the ancient Chinese animal style could have originated and developed under the influence of neighboring nomadic tribes and peoples, as a result of military and trade contacts. Objects with zoomorphic images and compositions that relate to the art of Ancient China of the Han period are carriers of the aesthetic principles of “steppe animalismˮ. These artistic images made in the “animal style” have a high level of decorative stylization, which are characteristic of Ancient Scythian and Hunnic art. Ancient Chinese art, unique both in its ancient semantics and in the style of depicting artistic images, is a phenomenal and still not fully explored phenomenon.

The study of ancient Greece is essential for the proper understanding of the evolution of modern Western medicine. An important innovation of classical Greek medicine was the development of a body of medical theory associated with natural philosophy, i.e. a strong secular tradition of free enquiry, or what would now be called "science" (Eπiστnμη). Medical education rests upon the ancient Greek foundations and its history remains a fascinating topic for modern physicians and medical teachers. As Drabkin so eloquently noted half a century ago: "the history of medical education will show how lasting was the influence of the ancient system of medicine, not only in its substantive contributions, but in its devotion to reason, in its attitude toward the relation between science and the medical art, in its concept of disease and classification of diseases, in its ethical attitudes and standards and in countless other ways".1 MEDICAL EDUCATION THROUGH "MAGIC" AND "RELIGION" In prehistoric times, magic and religion were a fundamental part of the healing practice. Therefore, the first primitive medical practitioners were witch doctors or sorcerers. Through a gradual process that lasted for centuries, superstition and religion were replaced by rational inquiry and explanation. At its beginnings, ancient Greek medicine was undoubtedly influenced by neighbouring regions such as Babylonia and Egypt or even more distant civilizations such as India and China.2 As medical practice was tied to magic and religion, so too was medical education symbolized in myth. Thus, the first Greek medical teacher was probably Chiron (Xípωv), the human-horse mythological figure. According to Homer, Chiron taught Asclepius the secrets of the drugs that relieve pain and stop bleeding. Chiron was so famous in his era that the sons of many noble families, including Jason (Iáσovαò), Achilles (Aχiλληαò) and other Homeric heroes, became his apprentices and lived with him during early adolescence studying philosophy and the sciences, including medical arts. Among his teachings the "techni" (τéχvη) (art) of caring for the ill and injured was included.3 Asclepius (Aσκληπióδ) was the God of Medicine in Ancient Greece and he was worshiped in hundreds of temples (Asclepions) throughout Greece. The remains of such shrines may still be seen at Epidaurus (Eπíδαvpoò), Cos (Kώ;ò), Athens (Aθηvα), and elsewhere. Asclepions (Aσκληπieíα) were founded at the 6th century B.C. and served as mysticistic centers of medical education for selected "godly blessed" priests. Patients visiting these sacred sanctuaries were treated by a healing ritual known as incubation, or temple sleep. They slept overnight in the dormitory, or abaton (áβατo), and were visited in their dreams by Asclepius and his daughters Hygeia and Panacea or by one of his priests, who gave them divine advice and inspiration. They reported their dreams to a priest the next morning. The pilgrims were either spontaneously healed or the priest prescribed a cure based on their dream. Evidently, the temple healers relied largely on the use of psychological methods, i.e. suggestion through the use of charms, rituals and incantations, but they also employed physical means, some if which were genuinely efficient. Thus, the temple patients were also offered hydrotherapy and enjoyed theatre, music, poetry and a good diet. It must be emphasized that the temple physicians of Asclepions differed from lay medical practitioners and there is no evidence that they acted as tutors to lay physicians. Patients who visited the Asclepions and treated by the ritual therapeutics were usually cases that were given up as incurable by lay medicine.4 Asclepius' legacy was bequeathed by his sons and students Podaleirius (IIoδαλpípeioò) (Internist) and Machaon (Mαχαóv) (Military surgeon) who also appeared in the homeric epics (8th century B.C.). It is notable how the passing of medical knowledge from generation to generation in Ancient Greece is so characteristically reflected in the Asclepius' family. Even Aclepius' father, Apollo, was originally considered the God of Medicine before inheriting his mantle to his sons. With the passage of time, the influence of superstition and religion on medicine steadily decreased until the boundary of rationality and magic was demarcated by the arrival of Hippocrates' rational medicine.5 However, it appears that, despite the occasional competitive bouts between these different types of healers, the Asclepian temple physicians generally existed side by side, in uneasy proximity, throughout the centuries with the Hippocratics until the formers' practice was eventually perceived as a pagan rite and thus rejected by early Christianity. MEDICAL "CRAFTSMEN" AND THE MENTORING OF MEDICINE IN ANCIENT GREECE The division between medicine as a "science" and medicine as an "art" is an ancient one. The ancient Greeks frequently contrasted the non-scientific practitioner to the theoretically grounded physician/philosopher. According to Plato, a medical apprenticeship that was based only on observation and experience was routine and impersonal in comparison to those physicians who strived to make the understanding of nature fundamental to their art and teaching.6 It appears that the majority of medical practitioners did not concern themselves with biological theories and philosophy. However, the few that did care about the nature of health and the underlying anatomic and physiological changes behind a particular disease, were considered the leaders of their profession.5 Greek doctors usually practiced privately but were occasionally employed by a city-state as public health officers who treated citizens without charge. These state-salaried physicians were supported by a special tax called "iatrikon" (Iαtpiκóv) and sometimes received additional benefits including tax reductions, free pass to recreational centres and statues erected in their honour. Such state participation in citizen health care is evidenced throughout antiquity and began as early as the 6th century B.C. However, no evidence exists that these civic physicians were involved in medical education or that special taxes like the "iatrikon" were used to finance public medical education. Various texts from the Hippocratic Collection help us understand Greek medical practice during the antiquity. A surprisingly large part of medical practice of that period seems to reflect the physician's insecure position. Thus, a good diagnostician aimed to impress the patient and win his confidence. The practice of prognosis was also an important proof of competence and a valuable psychological tool in gaining the patients' trust. On the other hand, physicians tended to decline cases that were obviously incurable in order to avoid any loss of reputation. To ensure that physicians would not amass too much wealth, they were advised to adjust their fees to each patient's means and, when necessary, treat them without payment. While some doctors were permanent residents in a particular city, a large number travelled from place to place searching for a living in response to the demand for doctors and seeking to possess intimate knowledge of the ailments peculiar to each region.5 No system of formal medical education or any curriculum program that issued diplomas to successful medical students existed in the classical antiquity. Even the first centres of medical excellence such as Cos and Cnidos and, later on, the museum of Alexandria (Aλεξávδpiα) did not provide any legally recognized certification or formal system of teaching. On the other hand, physicians who were associated with one of the major medical schools were probably more in demand compared to their less prestigiously educated peers. The passing on of knowledge through mentoring was highly regarded in the Greek antiquity from as early as Homer's (Oμηpoò) time.7 Accordingly, medical knowledge was bequeathed from father to son or to the physician's assistant via a master-apprentice relationship: the apprentice learned by observing and assisting his master curing patients.8 Such medical education was fundamentally practical. The student learned to take detailed medical history from the patient, his relatives or friends, catalogue observable regularities, and accordingly formulate rational hypotheses, explanations and treatments. He was trained to properly use his senses of observation, hearing, smelling, palpating and carefully examine the patient's pains, mental state, position in bed, fever, breathing, and excretions (urine, feces and sweats). The patient's pulse was also examined but its profound diagnostic significance was not elaboratively catalogued at these times. Practical experience was an essential component of the medical craft taught to the apprentice. As was noted in the Hippocratic texts: "He who aspires to practice surgery must go to war". A competent student would also attend the patient as a nurse in serious cases. Good students would complement such practical work with the study of books (e.g. the Hippocratic Collection, Dioskorides' book of herbals and drug preparation) in order to combine knowledge with experience and obtain self confidence and autonomy. The quality of training depended on the master's skills and the student's prowess. The length of education depended on the depth of the apprentice's studies and on his intellectual skills and competence.1 In theory, medical training was open to every man. Of course, the aspiring physician required a master willing to train him and the successful medical protégée required certain characteristics, including above-average intelligence and a firm grasp of reality. But in principle, the pursuit of medical knowledge in ancient Greece was unrestrained. Evidently, medical practice retained a very "free market" approach throughout the ancient world. The Babylonians characteristically presented their sick at the market place in search of those persons who could advise and/or treat the disease. In line with this attitude, no legally recognized method existed to prevent amateur and inadequately trained physicians or various kinds of quacks from practicing in Greek antiquity. One established himself as a doctor not by presenting his training certifications but by vigorously defending the reputation he acquired in practice and by carefully cultivating the confidence of his clients. The physicians' fierce competition with other healers, his conscience, and the patient's demands for efficacy were his only restrictions and incentives for self-improvement. The only possible evidence of completed medical training and qualification may have been the Hippocratic Oath, as well as attendance to one of the major medical schools. It may be strange that the ancient Greek civilization, with all its sophistication, failed to establish any means of protection from ignorant and potentially dangerous physicians. But one needs to remember the distinct features of ancient Greece that could explain why this system persisted and even how it could work adequately for so many centuries. The Greek region was literally fragmented into hundreds of independent city-states and this hindered any possible attempt of a unified professional evaluation policy. Therefore the ancients had to rely on the self-policing apprentice system by which Greek medical education was organized. Each of the masters, who were successful and experienced physicians, would take care in recruiting, selecting and training their apprentices and carefully monitor their progress to ensure the quality of their education, which was important to reputation of the master as well as the student. THE ROOTS OF RATIONAL MEDICINE First medical schools The first medical schools were founded in Greece and in the Southern Italy (Magna Grecia) regions of Sicily and Calabria. In the classical antiquity, medical "schools" were essentially schools of thought formed by an influential medical practitioner and his followers. There were no academic buildings dedicated to medical training. The "school" was essentially realized wherever its adherents would gather. With the coming of the 5th century B.C. the most famous of such centers were Cos, where Hippocrates (Iππoκpáτηò) was born, and Cnidus, situated just opposite of Cos on Asia Minor. These ancient Greek states developed medical schools that served as hallmarks of medical education. The doctors associated with these schools shared knowledge and certain medical practices; medical students retained a master-apprentice relation with their teachers and observed their masters treating diseases and prescribing measures such as good diet, exercise, and herbal remedies. Aspiring surgeons were trained as assistants to a military surgeon accompanying troops on a campaign. The instruction was of course very informal and there was no established certificate of the student's right to practice.1 Hippocratic medicine Hippocrates was born in about 460 B.C. on the island on Cos, an island of the coast of Asia Minor in the Dodecanese (Δωδεκávησα), where he developed his immensely influential rational school bringing about the transition from empiricism to scientific medicine in antiquity. During his lifetime, Hippocrates was undoubtedly the most renowned physician and teacher of medicine. Soranus stated that Hippocrates traced his descent and medical knowledge from his father Heraclidos (Hpáκλεiδoò) and Asclepius. He practiced medicine in his birthplace of Cos but also ventured in other parts of Greece including Athens, Sicily, Alexandria, Cyrine and Cyprus; he died in Thessaly at an advanced age in about 377 B.C. Although Hippocrates is widely considered the father of medicine and well-known scribes such as Plato and Aristotle have documented a number his achievements, there is little knowledge about his actual life and biography. There is even a possibility that Hippocrates was actually not one but many men of the same name.9 Whether Hippocrates was one man or several, the works attributed to him mark the stage in Greek medicine where physicians were encouraged to offer rational explanations concerning the cause and character of disease and health, instead of superstition and magic. Hippocrates' rational medicine was notably based on common sense and substituted divine intervention in favour of a profound, practical philosophy. Hippocrates is thought to have originated the concept of the "four humours" (plegm, yellow bile, black bile and blood) in medical physiology. The humoural doctrine stated that good health was the result of the harmonious equilibrium and blending of the four humours. Thus, disease was explained as the consequence of humoural imbalance. Relative excess of each humour resulted in particular personality types. An abundance of blood, yellow bile, black bile or phlegm was respectively associated with the sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric and melancholic temperaments. Hippocratic medicine notably emphasized maximum conservation in all medical treatments according to the famous Hippocratic motto: "to help or at least to do no harm". Hippocrates put more emphasis on diet and recommended a restricted use of drugs, which is to be expected if one considers that the rational medical use of herbs required a thorough systemization of the botanical world that would only be achieved a century after Hippocrates' death by Theophrastus (Teófpασtoò). Hippocrates also knew well how to describe a disease clearly and concisely and recorded treatment outcomes, both failures as well as successes.9 He also introduced the first concepts of medical ethics contained in the Hippocratic oath which still serves as the ethical nucleus of today's physicians.10 Hippocratic medicine gave emphasis on the patient rather than the disease and concentrated on experience and on the visual aspect of observation rather than theory. On the other hand, Cos' rival school, Cnidus, focused on a reductionist conception of disease, similar to the modern approach. However, Hippocrates' school achieved more wealth and recognition because it focused on the patient, while the school of Cnidus concentrated on studying the disease in the absence of the necessary technical instruments and general scientific infrastructure that could carry out its ideas the School of Cnidus ceased to exist, whereas that of Hippocrates flourished. The conflicting philosophies of medical education and the different interpretations of the nature of medicine (medicine as science versus medicine as art) raged on for several centuries until the unifying influence of Galen's (ταληvóò) (129-200 A.D.). Theories and research became the standard system that was passed on to later ages all the way to the 16th century. Medical education through the Hippocratic collection It is possible that Hippocrates was the author of only some, or even none, of the texts that comprise the Hippocratic Collection (Corpus Hippocraticum), a compilation of over 70 medical treatises that are traditionally attributed to him. Hippocrates' students and his two sons, Thessalus and Draco, were the successors of the Hippocratic tradition and a large part of the Hippocratic Collection, including the Oath, was written by them. The Hippocratic tradition became the accepted standard for medical education and these texts were taught in universities throughout most of the ancient West and during the Renaissance until the 19th century. The Hippocratic collection contained a series of aphorisms, among which is the well-known "Life is brief, art is long, opportunity is fleeting, experience is fallacious, judgement is difficult" (often shortened to the Latin tag, "Ars longa, vita brevis"). These passages are the foundation of Hippocrates' philosophy and lay much stress to careful, repetitious thought before a medical intervention. Such aphorisms are followed by case histories, summary accounts of the climatic conditions, brief comments on diseases, symptoms and prognostic indications, many of which remain valid.9 Post-Hippocratic era In the following century the work of Aristotle (Apτστéληò), regarded as the first great biologist, incalculably influenced medicine. Aristotle was a student of Plato at Athens and tutor to Alexander the Great (Mέγας Aλέξαvδρoς). His interests and studies included the entire world of living things. He was the founder of comparative anatomy and embryology and his work influenced scientific and medical thinking for the next 2 millennia.5 Following Aristotle's time, the centre of Greek culture shifted to the Egyptian city of Alexandria. The famous medical school of Alexandria was established in about 300 BC and replaced Cos and Cnidos as the foremost centre of medical excellence. Its two founders and best medical teachers were Herophilus (Eρóφιλoς), who is known as the first anatomist in history, and Erasistratus (Eρασίστρατoς), whom some regard as the founder of physiology. Medical studies at this great school were based on a more professional tutorship by its renowned teachers supplemented by practical apprenticeship under one of these physicians. Thus, the earlier periods' master-apprentice relationship was gradually replaced by that of professor-student. Due to this notable change in the character of medical education, large numbers of students were tutored by fewer professors. This university atmosphere did not in itself preclude clinical instruction and bedside teaching. It did however introduce a new non-professional direction for medical education in the sense that some students studied biology and medicine not for the purposes of professional practice but as part of scientific and philosophic exploration. This division of studies probably depended on each student's social status, with the more wealthy protégées generally preferring to focus on an academic approach to medicine. There were also certain individuals who studied almost every possible subject matter (polymaths). Such an endeavour to encompass all knowledge would have been incompatible with a busy medical practice. The tripartite division of medical education can be seen from as early as Aristotle's time described as "the physician who is a craftsman, the scientific physician, and the man who has studied medicine as part of his education".1 The museum of Alexandria continued as a centre of medical teaching even after the Roman Empire had attained supremacy over the Greek world. The medical education of women Women in Greek antiquity avoided examination and treatment from male physicians, a fact that often hindered successful treatment. This should not come as a surprise considering that ancient Greek women were taught from a young age to be ashamed of their bodies. Before the 5th century B.C. childbirth was almost exclusively entrusted to female kin and neighbours who had themselves given birth. Some of these women stood out because of their skills and became known by the title of "maia" (Mαία) or "midwife". Most midwife practitioners were usually trained from other midwives. The story of Agnodice (Aγvoδίκη), who according to myth was the first female to achieve the role of physician despite this being forbidden by law, has been cited by many Western midwives during the Renaissance in an attempt to medicalize childbirth. It seems that there were women in ancient Greece who studied medicine serving alongside leading male physicians and practiced obstetrics and gynaecology. As of yet there are few data regarding the involvement of women in general medical practice other than gynaecology.1,5,11 CONCLUSION Medical education in ancient Greece closely mirroring the evolution of ancient Greek though originates from magic and religion which is gradually superseded by more objective and leading to the Hippocratic rational medicine that with the of of ancient medical education such as the reputation system of medical education and practice may be peculiar But on these ancient can also the fundamental concepts that to modern practice. In a world that was by the first great medical schools a more ethical practice to their students and these were and by the today's medicine. than two to the of modern medical education.

This article examines the presence and uses of plants attested in the Chinese medical tradition in the materia medica literature of classical antiquity. It is based on the consultation of the major ancient compilations on materia medica of Chinese medicine and classical antiquity, specifically Bencao Gangmu by Li Shizhen (16th cent.) and De materia medica by Dioscorides (1st cent. A.D.). The article is divided in three major parts: the identification of plants used in the Chinese medical tradition in the medicine of the Mediterranean World in Antiquity; the analysis of the knowledge of these plants and their origin in classical antiquity; a comparison of the uses of these plants in the Bencao Gangmu and De materia medica. It traces the presence of plants of the Chinese medical tradition in Classical antiquity. Although their exact origin was not known, they were reputed at that time to be native to either India or the Black Sea, two areas that correspond to the ending points of the Silk Road. As for their uses in both traditions, they correspond for some plants, whereas they do not for others because either the uses attested in the Chinese tradition were not preserved on the Mediterranean or different uses appeared in the Mediterranean tradition. These differentiated uses hint at both continuities and ruptures, with the latter resulting from the long journey of the plants from the Chinese World to the Mediterranean and, at the same time, attempts aimed to diversify and optimize the applications of non-native medicinal substances.

In the twentieth century, at two crucial instances, comparisons with ancient Greek traditions played an important role in forwarding the argument in favor of the early origins of the pentateuchal narrative: Martin Noth’s “amphictyonic hypothesis” and Frank Moore Cross’s account of the Israelite “epic.” This article argues that success of these arguments owes to a hidden “parallelomania” at work in the mid-century, which successfully made the evidence of ancient Greek phenomena seem like something that it was not in service to desirable arguments. Finally, it explores how contemporary approaches can avoid repeating past mistakes.

The interplay between a naturalistic understanding of social origins and the vision of the ruler as God’s representative on earth is a major aspect of medieval and early modern Islamic political discourse. The ancient Greek tradition had a formative influence on Islamic meditation regarding the origins of human society, the role of government, justice, and the qualities of the good ruler. The aim of this article is to revisit the impact of the Greek legacy on various theories about the emergence of human society and political authority that were propounded medieval Islamic authors. In the first section of this article, I review the reception of ancient Greek sources in the Islamic world and reconsider their influence on subsequent debates about the nature and foundation of human society, especially during the ‘Abbāsid era. I will focus on Plato, Bryson, Themistius, and Nemesius, who depict human society as the corollary of human frailty and the need to procure the necessities of life. These authors articulate a naturalistic explanation of the origins of organized human society which reverberates in the philosophical and administrative literature of the ‘Abbāsid period. In addition, I will show how Qudāma B. Ja‘far and al-Fārābī facilitated the dissemination of Greek political ideas in the Islamic world and coupled Themistius’ rationale about communal association with the notion that rulership is related to a divine mandate for the sake of upholding social harmony. I will also demonstrate how these ideas reached their culmination in al-Ghazālī, who embraces a naturalistic approach to the creation of human society while proclaiming the ruler to be God’s shadow on earth in charge of maintaining order and implementing the ordinances of the sharī‘a.

Reviews 237 NOTES1· Benjamin Schwartz, The World ofThought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 67-85. 2. Translation adapted from D. C. Lau, trans., Confucius: The Analects (Penguin, 1979). $ <§? Henry Rosemont, Jr., editor. Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham. Critics and Their Critics Series, vol. 1. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991. xviii, 334 pp. Hardcover $49.95, Paperback $22.95. Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts is a fascinating and at times even moving book, valuable both for its scholarship and as a chronicle of the current debates surrounding the study of Chinese thought. It is the first volume in Open Court's "Critics and Their Critics" series, which collects essays on the work of an eminent scholar accompanied by the responses of the honorée. Graham, who died shordy after the publication of this book, was a man whose immense talents were complemented by a wide array of interests, which resulted in groundbreaking work in several related areas and some unrelated ones, as well. His doctoral dissertation on the Cheng brothers, published in 1958 as Two Chinese Philosophers (and republished under the same name by Open Court Press in 1992), is still one of the best books available on Neo-Confucian philosophy. Graham wrote highly specialized articles on technical aspects of ancient Chinese language and literature in addition to translating two volumes of poetry. His work on Mencius' notion of xing, "nature," and the logic of the later Mohists not only shed light on previously poorly understood subjects but also set new standards for scholarship on Chinese thought. As his career progressed, Graham became particularly interested in the fourth century b.c. philosopher Zhuangzi, on whom he was the undisputed authority in Western languages, and later still in the purely philosophical problems of rationality and value. In 1985 he published Reason and Spontaneity (Barnes & Noble), in which he attempted to ground value judgments in spontaneous inclinations , the best judgments coming when people are most completely aware of their situations. With such a diverse set of issues to address, it is not surprising that the essays© 1994 by University composing this volume should be somewhat scattered. They converge on the ofHawai'i Presswork of Professor Graham, as editor Henry Rosemont notes in his introduction (p. xi). But since Graham is no longer among the readers, there will probably be few others who have the background necessary even to understand, much less to 238 China Review International: Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1994 appreciate fully, what all the essays collected here have to say: some, like Edwin Pulleyblank's "Some Notes on Morphology and Syntax in Classical Chinese," require a sophisticated understanding oflinguistics while others, like Rosemont's "Who Chooses?" presuppose more than a passing familiarity with contemporary moral and political thought. The book is divided into three convenient sections, however, starting with grammar and philology, moving on to historical and interpretative issues, and culminating in the philosophical questions concerning reason and value. Graham tends in the first two sections to outshine the contributors to his volume , his responses lifting the discussion from technical details to more general reflections on the methods and goals of studying a people as remote from ourselves as the ancient Chinese. The opening essay by D. C. Lau deals with the phrase zai you, which is the title of the eleventh chapter of the Zhuangzi and may also occur in a corrupted form in the second. Graham translates the phrase as "keeping in place and within bounds" and identifies it as a doctrine central to what he describes as the "Primitivist" contribution to the Zhuangzi. Lau amasses examples of the occurrence of the same or variant characters in surrounding texts, on the basis ofwhich he proposes a different translation and a subsequent revision of the nature and lineage of the Primitivist position. In his response, Graham argues effectively for the inadequacy of a purely textual analysis of this sort. As important as textual analysis is, no examination of the characters alone can ever tell us what those characters mean or how they got there unless it is supplemented by philosophical and historical reflection. Graham's response to Lau does more than just collect the insights ofdifferent disciplines; it demonstrates the interdependence of those disciplines and the need to combine all of them in order to master any. In his essay on the mass noun hypothesis, Christoph Harbsmeier turns his attention to the idea, first presented by Chad Hansen, that Chinese nouns function as mass nouns like "water" or "fury," which need to be accompanied by sortais like "a pailful" or "a burst of" as opposed to count nouns like "chair" or "groan" that come, as it were, already in prepackaged units. Harbsmeier marshals impressive linguistic evidence demonstrating that Chinese nouns are in fact better understood as falling into three categories: count, mass, and generic. In his response, Graham generally concurs with Harbsmeier's analysis and then goes on, in the offhand style that was so characteristic of him, to derive a penetrating and illuminating insight from this seemingly inert linguistic fact: That horses and chariots will be counted in only one way goes without saying irrespective of one's language, but it does seem that Classical Chinese, because it does not assimilate all nouns to count nouns by number terminations, escapes our tendency to assimilate things in general to the organisms and artifacts which stand out from their surroundings as discrete individuals, (p. 276) Reviews 239 Unlike most European languages, the grammar ofClassical Chinese does not suggest or substantiate the notion ofa world already full ofthings just waiting to be named, a presupposition which is not only pervasive in the history ofWestern thought but difficult to excise even in the present. Subtle observations like this, which not only transform our understanding ofwhat is going on in a place like ancient China but in the process add new depth to our understanding ofourselves , are the raison d'être of comparative philosophy and one of the pleasures of this volume. Graham shines similarly in his response to Hansen's own essay, titled "Should the Ancient Masters Value Reason?" Hansen describes reasoning as the process of drawing conclusions from given premises: axioms, definitions, or some description of the facts. Chinese philosophers, he argues, were concerned with the problem ofhow to divide the world up into things and classes, that is, with establishing the proper way to describe the facts. Since logical analysis of the facts can start only after some description of the facts is established, Hansen concludes that reason was of only limited use to the ancient Chinese. Graham points out that Hansen's claim is surely too strong if it is taken to mean that Chinese thinkers worry only about classifying terms and European thinkers worry only about analyzing them: Hansen manoeuvres himself into a position of making the Chinese preoccupation with dividing and naming the Chinese alternative to the Western with establishing truth by reason. He then continues: It seems to me to be crucial to maintain the distinction between the structures of thinking, which may be presumed to be transcultural (2 and 2 make 4 wherever you are), and its varying conceptualizations in different cultures, (pp. 292293 ) This is an important point that does a great deal to clarify what exactly it is that comparative philosophy does. We must assume that others, whether they be the ancient Chinese or our next-door neighbors, think similarly enough to ourselves at least so that we can come to understand them; if their thinking were entirely different, we would not only be unable to understand them at first but would have no hope of understanding them ever. The object of a study like this, then, is not the fundamentally different ways that people think but rather the relatively different ways that people think about thinking, the different styles of reasoning they employ, and the various advantages and limitations these different styles confer. But while it is necessary to posit a transcultural activity ofthinking in general, it is equally necessary to avoid confusing this broad category with our own provincial variation of it. One of the purposes of comparative philosophy, therefore, is to distinguish between who we are as inheritors ofparticular traditions and who we are simply as human beings. 240 China Review International: Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1994 The text ofthe Zhuangziwas edited into its present form by the fourth-century commentator Guo Xiang, who is known to have started with a fifty-two chapter version, which he condensed down into the present thirty-three. Harold Roth's article "Who Compiled the Chuang TzuV is an attempt to locate the origin of the original fifty-two chapter version. Taking excellent advantage of work done by Ma Xulun and Wang Shumin, Roth locates several incompatibilities in the text as it stands, passages that are juxtaposed but that represent such radically different agendas that they can only be explained by diversity of authorship. He argues that these incompatibilities were already present in the text received by Guo Xiang but that they must postdate the second century b.c. editor identified by Graham as the "Syncretist," whose programmatic approach would not allow for such inconsistencies . Roth argues effectively for the conclusion that there is a third hand in the text between the Syncretist and Guo Xiang, although he is able to amass only speculative and circumstantial evidence for his identification of this hand as belonging to an eclectic at the court of Huai Nan around 130 b.c. Roger Ames argues that xing, "nature," in Mencius should be understood as a goal to be achieved rather than as "a psychobiological starting point" (p. 143). What people are born with, he argues, taking his cue from Tang Junyi, "is simply the propensity for growth, cultivation, and refinement" (p. 152). "For Mencius," he continues, "the human being emerges in the world as a spontaneously arising and ever changing matrix of relationships through which, over a lifetime, his xing is defined" (p. 155, emphasis added). Animals have fairly little control over their characters, and plants have even less; what is different about people, according to Ames, is that we make ourselves who we are. Thus the "emergence" he describes is not the physical process of birth but the cultural and social process of becoming a person in the peculiarly human sense, that is, a distinct individual, occupying a unique place in the community in relation to others. If this is what it means to be human, then human nature is not something we start with but something we work toward. But while Ames makes a strong case that we ought to think of human nature in these terms, his argument that Mencius did so is inconclusive; if, as Ames suggests, human nature is what we make of it, then it is hard to see how Mencius could base any normative claims on it, which he clearly did. Indeed, the claim that "(t)he 'good' is not the actualization of some given potential, but the consequential optimization of the conditions defining of a particular thing over its history" sounds more like Zhuangzi than Mencius. Whether one is persuaded by the argument or not, however, Ames' essay sparks reflection on the unconscious conceptual translations we all make even when reading texts in the original. It is with David Nivison's essay "Hsun Tzu and Chuang Tzu" that the volume really begins to pick up speed. Nivison is another elder in the field of Chinese thought and will be the honorée of the third volume in this series. (Another contributor , Herbert Fingarette was honored with the second.) A distinctive and im- Reviews 241 portant feature ofboth Nivison's and Graham's interpretative method has been to focus attention notjust on isolated thinkers but on the influences and antagonisms between them. In this essay, Nivison speculates on the possible relation between Graham's own favorite thinker, Zhuangzi, and the third member ofthe early Confucian triumvirate, Xunzi, a thinker largely ignored in the past but apparently destined for greater attention in the future. Although Nivison's analysis of Zhuangzi is sketchy at points—it is not obvious either that Zhuangzi counseled a "literal withdrawal from the world" (p. 135) or that he aimed at "ataraxia as a supreme personal religious goal" (p. 136)—his account is generally in keeping with Graham's own interpretation ofZhuangzi as advocating the course ofaction along which one would be spontaneously moved in a state of impartial awareness. Nivison turns the tables, however, by arguing that Xunzi uses just such an approach to arrive at his own brand of Confucianism and that, if Zhuangzi had applied his own method scrupulously enough, he, too, "would have thought his way to the Confucian Tao" (p. 139). Graham's response to Nivison's good humored but ruthless thrust at his favorite thinker is brief, but is essential in understanding what goes on in the rest of the volume. He states, though without argument, first, that it simply is not true that an unprejudiced person who was aware of the situation would be moved toward Confucianism, and, second, that even if Xunzi were so moved, this is no guarantee that others would be, as well (p. 286). Graham does not elaborate on these points here. But it is taken for granted for the remainder of the volume that people's spontaneous inclinations from the standpoint of impartial awareness fail to confirm the status of the kinds of cultural commitments that are central to Confucianism. Pace Nivison, it is the ¿«compatibility of Zhuangzi and Xunzi that occasions the debate that closes the volume. Graham spent much of his later career defending the idea that what one ought to do is what one would be spontaneously moved to do from a standpoint of complete awareness. In "Reason, Spontaneity, and the Li" Herbert Fingarette questions whether awareness, or at least the right kind of awareness, is possible without presupposing certain social and cultural commitments represented by the Confucian Ii. Fingarette agrees with Graham in rejecting Nivison's assumption that cultural values are rules of thumb that an impartial and open-minded survey of the facts would prompt us to adopt spontaneously anyway. Someone who has made a promise to a friend, on Fingarette's view, would not necessarily be inclined simply on the basis of an impartial awareness of the situation to keep the promise if it were to her advantage not to do so; rather, her disinclination, if she felt any, would be premised on her prior commitment, not necessarily conscious or deliberate, to the value of fidelity. "(W)e learn and practice the Ii of our culture not because we find it to be right, but by virtue of its defining for us what we are to value as right" (p. 218). Certain things are bad for us because we have learned 242 China Review International: Vol. 1, No. 2, Fall 1994 to think of them as bad. We can be aware of their badness only after enculturation . Culture, therefore, has a logical priority over awareness. In the final essay, "Who Chooses?" Henry Rosemont sharpens this critique of Graham's notion of awareness. Graham himself acknowledges that complete awareness of everything is impossible; so he qualifies his position as calling for awareness only of the relevant facts, that is, those facts that would effect one's spontaneous inclinations. But, as Rosemont argues, the facts that are relevant to me vary depending on how I conceive of myself. Different things will matter to me, for instance, if I think of myself primarily as a member of a certain ethnic group or social class, as an isolated individual or as a human being, as someone with a whole life ahead of me or someone just struggling to get through this afternoon . The ways in which I can think of myself are infinite. Nor can one determine one's identity by an appeal to the relevant facts, since one cannot decide which facts are relevant until one has determined one's identity. It is our community that tells us who we are, according to Rosemont, confirming Fingarette's conclusion that awareness is dependent on culture. Both Fingarette and Rosemont doubt the possibility of ever stepping completely outside culture. And they agree further that, even if this were possible, it would not be desirable, since the right kind of awareness or self-conception is dependent on having the rignrkind of culture. This, of course, begs the question of what the right culture is and how much of it one should internalize; nor is there any obvious noncircular solution to this problem. And this is exactly where their disagreement with Graham lies. Fingarette and Rosemont argue from within an internallyjustified set of norms and values which they admit to be cultural products but in which they nonetheless believe; their concern is in understanding, administering , and preserving them. Graham argues from the outside; although he is not hostile to the values Fingarette and Rosemont take for granted, he is concerned with justifying and evaluating them and is always prepared, if necessary, to abandon them. This difference lurks in the background of the debate, and the reader wonders at times whether the writers themselves are fully aware of it. The closest it comes to being out in the open is over the question of whether cultural rules have a force that is logically prior to the spontaneous inclinations of individuals. For Fingarette and Rosemont they must; but Graham denies this is possible. He says: When community breaks up, as it hasfor us, how does one convert one's spontaneous preferences into a code with autonomous authority?. . . Any code they generate can only be a personal one, which at best will contribute to sowing the seeds of true community in thefuture, (p. 307, emphasis added) For Fingarette and Rosemont the community and its rules exist, and the question is how to sustain them. For Graham, on the other hand, the community is past, its rules have lost their force, and the question is how to survive and flourish in Reviews 243 their absence. It is no wonder they disagree over the solution when they have such fundamentally different notions ofwhat the problem is. Whether or not the community exists and whether cultural rules have independent normative force remain open questions at the end of the book and are left to the readers unresolved. The points at which the thinkers in this volume argue past one another are as informative as the points on which they clash. In their conflicting agendas and assumptions, particularly in their collective ambivalence toward traditional culture, readers recognize the forces that have shaped the study of Chinese thought in the West over the last several decades. At the same time, too, they are likely to recognize tensions that motivate and inform their own understanding of these subjects. Readers ofthe "Critics and Their Critics" series see more than just philosophy recorded; they see it happen. Paul Kjellberg Whittier College Harold D. Roth. The Textual History ofthe Huai-nan Tzu. AAS Monograph Series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992. xvi, 470 pp. Hardcover $36, Paperback $20. Required reading for anyone interested in the study of the Huai-nan Tzu, this work will serve as the authoritative historical and textual analysis of the Huai-nan Tzu for years to come. This book will be of interest to students of textual analysis, interpretation, publishing, and history. Roth's work is based on a critical application ofVinton Dearing's theoretical examinations of textual analysis, namely, A Manual ofTextualAnalysis (Berkeley, 1959) and Principles and Practice ofTextual Analysis (Berkeley, 1974). The text we know as the Huai-nan Tzu was one of three works completed under the patronage of Liu An, prince of Huai-nan, and was completed by 139 b.c. The essays were probably written by Liu An and a group of eight scholars. At least one copy, but possibly two copies, of the Huai-nan Tzu were placed in the imperial library before Liu Hsiang collated them in circa 10 b.c. Only two of the four, possibly five, commentaries written in the Han dynasty survived, those of Hsu© 1994 by University shen and Kao Yu. These two commentaries represent the two lines of transmisofHawai ?PresssjQn unti, ^6 fourm cgntuj-^when a recension was made by combining thirteen chapters of the Kao Yu edition with eight chapters from the Hsü Shen edition. The composite recension served as the basis for the three oldest extant redactions ...

Cicero’s seminal treatise, De Divinatione, demonstrates a nuanced approach that concurrently affirms and questions the significance and suitableness of divinatory practices. This dialectical perspective finds a parallel when looking at two ancient Confucian scholars, Dong Zhongshu and Xunzi, each of them offering a version of the conundrum highlighted by Cicero’s treatise. A comparative examination of Stoic philosophy, as expounded by Cicero, and of Dong Zhongshu’s The Interactions between Heaven and Humankind underscores the fact that both traditions assert that some form of interconnection between natural and supranatural phenomena is to be found. In parallel the comparison between Cicero and Xunzi (both exponents of classical rationalism) reveals their shared rejection of divinatory speculations, albeit with an acknowledgment of the political and cultural necessity of maintaining and supporting the associated ritualistic practices. Our dual comparison reveals the complex tension that was at play between speculative constructs and practical rationality in the ancient Chinese and Greco-Latin intellectual traditions.

This paper aims to analyze the different views of war in ancient China and ancient Greece, based on The Book of Songs and Ancient Greek Mythology. The comparisons are divided into three parts: the distinction of background, views in The Book of Songs, and attitudes towards war in Ancient Greek Mythology, and finally conclusion will be drawn. In the first part, the geography factors will be given, and then the analyses of lifestyles, personalities and beliefs that are influenced or shaped by the natural environment follow, also including the comparisons. The second part is on the views of war in The Book of Songs where four typical examples are given which represent four genres that indicate four different attitudes towards war in ancient China, also with analyses. Part three is based on Ancient Greek Mythology, the Trojan War especially, which fully exemplifies the western view of war. The analyses of the culture of offensive war and individual heroism follow. Finally, in the last part, some suggestions for nowadays diplomacy will be given based on the analyses and comparisons above. Also, the culture of defensive war and patriotism, as the two most distinct and significant beliefs, are worth highlighting separately, for they still deeply affect nowadays Chinese.