Abstract
This paper considers a multi-user multi-relay network. The relay power allocation among the users and pricing problem are studied. We model the interaction between the relay and users as a Stackelberg game, where the relay is the leader who gets paid for helping users forward signal, and user is the followers who pay to receive relay service. For the relay power allocation, a bargaining game is deployed to model the negotiation among the users on relay power allocation. We propose the Kailai–Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS) of bargaining game in order to formulate the relay power allocation. Simulation results are shown the proposed KSBS-based scheme has better network sum-rate than even power allocation and achieves close-to-sum-rate-optimal solution.
Published Version
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