Abstract

Since the return of the direct elections of the heads of the Russian regions in 2012, the terms of service of 143 regional leaders have expired. 66 leaders received an extension, while 77 did not. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the heads of the regions, supported by the federal center and the president in particular, are re-elected. What motivates the federal center’s decisions to support the governor’s nomination for a new term? What are the reasons why the Kremlin approves the regional governors’ re-election? This article is devoted to finding answers to these questions. The study uses data on 104 governors, whose terms of service ended in 2012—2019, and employs the method of a binary logistic regression. The author tested several hypotheses elaborated within the framework of the political, economic and social approaches. On the basis of the regression analysis the author rejected the hypothesis that the political survival of governors depends on the regional electoral performance of the United Russia and Vladimir Putin in the federal elections. The hypothesis about the connection between the economic growth of the region and the governor’s retention of the post was not corroborated. The only factor that appeared to be statistically significant for the re-election of an incumbent was the socio-economic situation in the region, which indicates that the political longevity of regional leaders is primarily determined by their ability to maintain socio-economic stability.

Highlights

  • What motivates the federal center’s decisions to support the governor’s nomination for a new term? What are the reasons why the Kremlin approves the regional governors’ re-election? This article is devoted to finding answers to these questions

  • The author tested several hypotheses elaborated within the framework of the political, economic and social approaches

  • On the basis of the regression analysis the author rejected the hypothesis that the political survival of governors depends on the regional electoral performance of the United Russia and Vladimir Putin in the federal elections

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Summary

Smyth and Turovsky

Как подчеркивают многие исследователи, федерализм в России носит условный и символический характер, и за фасадом федерализма скрываются унитарные практики. De facto Россия представляет собой федерацию без федерализма. Однако их возвращение сопровождалось введением муниципального фильтра: для регистрации в качестве кандидата претенденту теперь требовалось заручиться поддержкой определенной доли муниципальных депутатов. Сами авторы идеи муниципального фильтра представляли его как страховку от прихода к руководству регионом некомпетентных или неконструктивных персон (ставленников олигархата или криминала, популистов, людей без должного управленческого опыта). В последние годы появилось немало работ, в которых утверждается, что результаты прямых выборов глав регионов определяются не в день голосования, а в момент составления окончательных списков участников. Необходимо отметить, что, помимо муниципального фильтра, у Кремля имеются и другие инструменты воздействия на исход губернаторских кампаний, такие как административная мобилизация, манипуляции явкой и т.д. Назначение и замена губернаторов фактически оказываются прерогативами Москвы, и она активно ими пользуется

Hale 2003
13 Sharafutdinova 2013
19 Slider 2009
22 Кынев 2019
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