Khomeini's Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult (Wilayat al-Faqih) Revisited: The Aftermath of Iran's 2009 Presidential Election

Abstract

The serious crisis that has unfolded after June 2009 presidential election in Iran exposed absolutist nature of state's highest religious authority, and urgent need to critically interrogate Ayatollah Khomeini's concept of governance of jurisconsult (wilayat al-faqih). Jurists and scholars have been attempting to devise a model in which sovereignty belongs to public by basing their arguments on historical, jurisprudential, theological, philosophical, and extra-religious frameworks to present state models which allow for public sovereignty and challenge notion of divine sovereignty inhering in jurisconsult.The prediction of Ayatollah Hoseyn-'Ali Montazeri (d. 2009)1 that doctrine of al-wilaya al-mutlaqa [the all-comprehensive and absolute authority of jurisconsult] could degenerate into religious and clerical despotism [estebdad] seems to have come true in a most glaring form: political situation after country's June 2009 presidential election. Protesters who believed that massive fraud and vote rigging had occurred were met by a brutal and forceful reaction from Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei, jurisconsult [vali-ye faqih] who occupies Islamic Republic's supreme position. In his first post-election Friday prayer service, he proclaimed categorically that he would tolerate no more protests or challenges to validity of President Ahmadinejad's reelection with a remarkable 62% of electoral votes and an impressive turnout of 85% of all eligible voters. Construing this as a sign of divine grace and endorsement, he equated any dissent or questioning with greatest crime2 one can commit againstthe nation of Iran. In addition, he signaled to other two presidential candidates, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Ayatollah Mehdi Karroubi, that they would be held accountable if any more blood was shed as state strove to restore order and normality.This was a veiled threat to protesters and a signal to hardliners in Revolutionary Guards (Sepah) that they had some degree of official permission to use coercive methods while putting down protests.3 This arbitrary and excessive use of discretionary authority opened still ongoing discourse on merits of concept of wilayat al-faqih [or velayat-e faqih in Persian, i.e., governance of jurisconsult], which currently lacks any checks and balances.When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989) originally promulgated this concept in a 1970 series of lectures delivered in Najaf, Iraq, he relied on both rational and traditional proofs to buttress his case that during concealment of messianic infallible Imam,4 whom believers hold went into occultation in 941,5 jurisconsult has a mandate to implement Islamic rulings not only in matters of devotion and personal affairs, but also in realm of social and political.6 In other words, his prerogative is considered an extension of authority enjoyed by divine guides (also known as the infallible Imams). Khomeini advocated an Islamic state led by a qualified jurisconsult who would ensure that Islamic rulings are adhered to and implemented within broad outlines and principles of shari'a. Thus, his scope of authority was at least circumscribed by fallible human interpretation of nebulous concept of shari'a.7Toward end of his life, however, Khomeini stretched this concept to its farthest limit and expanded scope of jurisconsult's authority8 by proclaiming in January 1988 that this person is not confined to shari'a if it conflicts with society's and best interests.9 Just what constitutes this general welfare and imperative necessity, as well as how they are measured, remained undefined and vague. Moreover, customary checks and balances over this person's expansive powers are conspicuously absent. With this proclamation, Khomeini elevated state's preservation to a primary injunction [al-ahkam al-awwaliyya] and downgraded rituals (e. …