Kharitonov theorem-based robust control approach for sustainable microgrid against DoS cyber-attack

Abstract

With the inclusion of cyber-physical systems (CPS) in the power system, the security of the power system is jeopardized. The application of communication channels facilitates the exchange of information, but at the cost of increasing the vulnerability of the system. This paper presents an application of the Kharitonov Theorem-based proportional-integral (KT-PI) control technique for load frequency control (LFC) of a microgrid subjected to cyber-attacks. The microgrid is composed of renewable energy sources (RESs), controllable energy sources, and energy storage systems (ESSs). The microgrid is subjected to a cyber-attack, namely a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. The robustness and effectiveness of the proposed control technique is examined by considering the effect of parametric uncertainties and nonlinearities namely generation rate constraint (GRC) and governor dead-band (GDB). The quantitative comparative analysis is determined in terms of various performance indices such as integral square error (ISE), integral absolute error (IAE) and integral of time absolute error (ITAE) using proposed KT-PI and ZN-PI controllers. The stability of the microgrid subjected to the aforementioned cyber-attack using the proposed KT-PI and existing ZN-PI techniques is analyzed using Eigenvalue approach. The simulation results presented in the end clearly establishes the better performance of KT-PI approach as compared to ZN-PI controller in handling DoS attacks.