Abstract
The author of this study revisits and re-examines Keith Donnellan's 1966 reference and definite description. According to Donnellan, the definite description can be used in two ways: attributively and referentially. The former asserts the subject being discussed, whereas the latter refers to the issue a speaker intends to discuss. When a definite description is employed in a referential manner, the speaker implies the existence of a specific someone or thing that fits the description. In the attributive usage of definite descriptions, no such presupposition exists. Russell and Strawson both failed to recognize the dual nature of the roles of definite descriptions, and this study re-examines their errors.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
More From: International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
