Abstract
Research in corporate governance has long considered the interlocking nature of corporate directorships. We model the characteristics of executives who secure outside directorships at other firms as well as characteristics of their home firms and those of the firms they join. We view the securing of outside directorships as a sequential process, one in which the first outside directorship is an influential predictor of both the likelihood of joining another board as well as the characteristics of subsequent boards for those who join them. Moreover, we model the interconnectedness between the executive's home firm and any boards they join. In general, our evidence suggests that aspects of first outside directorships are important in understanding characteristics of subsequent outside directorships. In addition, our evidence suggests that interpersonal networks may not be as influential in the director selection process as previously thought.
Published Version
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