Kant's Teleological Ethics

Abstract

Kant's ethical theory is frequently misportrayed and misunderstood. Only ignorance of the greater number of his published books and essays can lead to the sort of comment, still quite common in Britain, that Kant is a stern philosopher of duty for duty's sake, without regard to considerations of human fulfilment and happiness, or that the sense of duty has for him no necessary relation to human purposes or desires. My aim in this paper is to show conclusively, from important but neglected writings of Kant, that such estimates are mistaken; that, though Kant did stress, as no-one had previously, the categorical nature of moral obligation, yet Kantian ethics is, in a fundamental sense, a teleological ethic, concerned above all with ends of action and human fulfilment. I will outline briefly Kant's teleological ethics, trace its development throughout his published works, and, finally, suggest that the formalistic terminology by means of which Kant expresses his view, and which has helped to mislead commentators, is a derivative of the Critical epistemology badly adapted to express his ethical views.