Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines Green's views toward Kantian doctrines. Green is clearly sympathetic to central Kantian doctrines. First, his criticism of empiricist metaphysics and epistemology is deeply indebted to Kant's views of empirical knowledge in the first Critique. Like Kant, Green also thinks that moral requirements apply to all moral agents in so far as they are agents — that is, in so far as they have capacities for practical reason and independently of contingent inclinations and interests. However, Green is not uncritical of Kant. The Prolegomena promises, but never really delivers, a critical discussion of Kant's ethical theory. A compilation of Green's reservations about Kant's ethical theory from his stray remarks in the Prolegomena and his lectures on Kant's ethics, is presented.
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