Kant’s Moral Philosophy in the 1790s

Abstract

Abstract Kant refined and amplified his moral philosophy in his major works of the 1790s (as well as building a political philosophy upon it, which is not considered here). One major development in the Critique of the Power of Judgment and the 1793 essay on “Theory and Practice” was the development of a conception of the highest good as a completion of morality realizable in human history rather than in personal immortality, although still in a nature underwritten by God. In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason Kant responded to the objection that he left no room for free but evil action by arguing that our evil is the product of free choice, but precisely because the choice is free we are also free to undertake a “change of heart” from evil to good. Finally, in his last major work, the Metaphysics of Morals of 1797, he developed a full catalogue of the duties of human beings by applying the fundamental principle of morality to the general circumstances of actual human existence. Freedom of action and freedom of the will are the central concepts in Kant’s thought in this period.