Abstract
Bernard Williams critica a moral kantiana como responsável por uma falha crucial da ética contemporânea. Em Problemas do Eu, ele afirma que os filósofos ingleses limitam-se a reconhecer as emoções como um componente potencialmente destrutivo da moralidade. Opondo-se a isto, ele tenta refutar várias visões de Kant sobre emoções, de acordo com as quais as emoções seriam apenas um produto de uma causa natural, além de volúveis e experimentadas de forma passiva. Mostrarei que Kant tem um lugar para as emoções na sua teoria moral; entretanto, ele defende que podemos agir moralmente sem nenhum móbil sensível. Pretendo provar que Bernard Williams e Kant possuem diferentes modelos de motivação moral e que Kant não concorda com a expressão de Williams “apenas motivações motivam”, visto que a lei moral poderia levar a uma ação, sem a necessidade de um motivo sensível.
Highlights
Resumo: Bernard Williams critica a moral kantiana como responsável por uma falha crucial da ética contemporânea
When explaining the difference between acting from duty and according to duty, Kant presents the example of two philanthropists, distinguishing the one that possess a close pleasure in spreading joy to his fellow humans beings from the one who helps other people out of duty: Suppose, that the mind of this philanthropist were overclouded by his own grief, which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of the others, 2 Ameriks, K
Borges – Kant on emotions and Williams’ criticism value is still the one whose incentive is the respect for the law, what does not hinder us to use our sensible feelings, such as sympathy, for the purposes of reason
Summary
In the article “Kant and Motivational Externalism”, Karl Ameriks insists that “if a Kantian still wishes to reach a truly cosmopolitan audience, it makes sense to step back beyond the perspective of Kantian scholarship alone, and to reflect on the basic features that contemporary philosophers would insist that any acceptable theory treat with sensibility”.2 Commentators have been tempted to follow this Humean trend and find out sensible incentives in Kant. I will go back to Kant’s texts, in order to locate where we can find sensibility or sensitivity and in which sense these feelings are necessary to action. Can we act morally without any sensible incentives?. But one should act without any moral feeling. Sympathy for other people’s fortune, as a feeling that leads to beneficence, is analyzed in the well known example of the Groundwork. When explaining the difference between acting from duty and according to duty, Kant presents the example of two philanthropists, distinguishing the one that possess a close pleasure in spreading joy to his fellow humans beings from the one who helps other people out of duty: Suppose, that the mind of this philanthropist were overclouded by his own grief, which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of the others,
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