Kant's pragmatic use of reason from a sociological point of view: Third way or methodological impasse?

Abstract

The paper focuses on the relevance of Kant's anthropologically oriented idea of the pragmatic use of reason for specific theoretical approaches in sociology. As I show in the first part, Kant's explicit presence in 20th-century sociology does not refer much to his anthropology and specifically to its cornerstone – the pragmatic use of reason which establishes a subtle connection between the theoretical and practical functions of reason. As an instrument for gaining systematic knowledge about the social world and ourselves as beings both passively and actively involved in this process, Kant's pragmatic use of reason serves a specific form of the theoretical use of reason. At the same time, it embodies a kind of practical reasoning concerning the “general welfare” in the social sphere. Building on the key arguments in the first part, I then address the question of whether we can view Kant's pragmatic approach as a possible third way for sociology today, beyond the simplifying opposition of ‘theoretical’ normativity and ‘realistic’ empiricism, and whether this third way can help us in clearing specific sociological issues. Here, I focus on two examples, namely the use of Kant's notion of “unsocial sociability” in Ralf Dahrendorf's conflict theory and on the criticism of Kant's cosmopolitanism in Ulrich Beck's reformed sociology of cosmopolitanism.