Abstract
The recurrent theme in Kant's critique of the paralogisms of rational psychology is that we lack any intuition of the self or soul, and are therefore incapable of knowing anything about its metaphysical nature. This criticism, if sound, would show that something is wrong with the rational psychologist's arguments, but not what it is. In what follows, I shall ignore Kant's general critique and look (with or without Kant's help) for specific places where the rational psychologist goes astray?as well as for an alter native route by which one of his conclusions might still be reached.
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