Kant a problematický pojem věci o sobě

Abstract

The paper discusses Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves, phenomena and noumena, and the problem of affection. The difference between appearances and things in themselves is understood as a methodological difference between two manners in which an object can be viewed: either as an appearance, or as a thing in itself. The author claims that this double-aspect view is a consequence of Kant’s conception of space and time as a priori forms of sensibility. The difference between phenomena and noumena, on the other hand, cannot be explained only by the double-aspect view; Kant understands it also as an ontological difference between two different kinds of objects. The paper concludes with a discussion of the problem of affection. The author claims that this problem is a pseudo-problem if we understand the difference between appearances and things in themselves as double-aspect view. Kant had maintained only an empirical affection. Passages in which Kant seems to advocate a transcendental affection can be brought in line with Kant’s critical philosophy.