J-value assessment of relocation measures following the nuclear power plant accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi

I Waddington,G.J Vaughan,R.H Taylor,P.J Thomas

doi:10.1016/j.psep.2017.03.012

Abstract

Abstract The policies of population relocation put in train following the severe nuclear reactor accidents at Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 are examined using the Judgement- or J-value. Here relocation is taken to mean a movement of people that is long-term or permanent. A review is made of a 1992 IAEA/CEC study of the Chernobyl countermeasures, which includes data from which the effectiveness of the 1986 and post-1990 relocations may be judged using the J-value. The present analysis provides endorsement of that study’s conclusion that the post-1990 relocation of 220,000 members of the public could not be justified on the grounds of radiological health benefit. Moreover, application of the J-value suggests that the first Chernobyl relocation is economically defensible for between 26% and 62% of the roughly 115,000 people actually moved in 1986. Thus only between 9% and 22% of the 335,000 people finally relocated after Chernobyl were justifiable, based on the J-value and the data available. Nor does the J-value support the relocation of the 160,000 people moved out on a long-term basis after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The J-value results for these very severe nuclear accidents should inform the decisions of those deciding how best to respond to a big nuclear accident in the future. The overall conclusion is that relocation should be used sparingly if at all after any major nuclear accident. It is recognised that medical professionals are seeking a good way to communicate radiation risks in response to frequent requests from the general public for information and explanation in a post-accident situation. Radiation-induced loss of life expectancy, which lies at the heart of the application of the J-value to nuclear accidents, is proposed as an information-rich yet easy to understand statistic that the medical profession and others may find helpful in this regard.

Highlights

In the event of an industrial accident with off-site consequences, decision-makers must decide who, if anyone, ought to be evacuated from the surrounding area
We have examined the first, 1986 relocation after the Chernobyl accident, and shown that it is possible to justify the relocation of 31,000 in the Base Case, with an upper bound of 72,500, a number obtained when the 95th percentile heuristic is invoked in addition to the J-value
The present study suggests that mass relocation after Fukushima Daiichi was a poor policy response

Summary

Introduction

In the event of an industrial accident with off-site consequences, decision-makers must decide who, if anyone, ought to be evacuated from the surrounding area. If the accident results in prolonged restrictions on the normal use of the land, decisions must be made about who can return to their homes and who should be temporarily or permanently relocated. In the civil nuclear industry, the only two events that have caused the authorities to recommend relocation are the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in 1986 and that at the Fukushima Daiichi power station in Japan in 2011. This paper assesses how far the relocation programmes following these events were justified and considers the import of the results for future decision making. It would certainly seem that resistance to going back and problems with a large-scale return are likely to be encountered once people have stayed away for a year or more, as in the cases of the accidents at both Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi

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Discussion

Conclusion