Justice Peters and the Criminal Law

Abstract

When first invited to participate in this tribute to Justice Raymond E. Peters, I hesitated.' After all, I had not closely followed his career as a jurist, nor did I have any special familiarity with his opinions or judicial philosophy. But I was intrigued by the opportunity to study the justice who only recently in writing the opinion in People v. [another] Norman Abrams2 commented that the issues turned largely upon the credibility of petitioner and then proceeded to reject all of the petitioner's contentions.' Reading the opinions, both majority and dissenting, written by a single justice over a limited period of time is an instructive exercise. Although it may not give any longterm historical perspective into the evolution of the man's judicial philosophy, it will reveal his stance on some of the more important legal issues of the time. It may also provide some insight into the degree to which that justice possesses the qualities that a jurist ought to have-qualities such as independence of mind, craftsmanship, imagination and breadth of vision. On all of these counts, Justice Peters scores well. That he possesses these qualities is best demonstrated by a close examination of his opinions. In Part I, therefore, I review a number of his dissents on constitutional criminal procedure. Although he has written numerous majority opinions in this area,' it is clearly in the vigor and independence of his dissents that he is at his best. It is much more difficult to get a clear impression of Justice Peters from his opinions on substantive criminal law. Consequently in Part II, I have contented myself with taking the opportunity to use two of his recent opinions on felony-murder as a vehicle to make some suggestions for correcting an existing imbalance in the California law of homicide.