Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: Managing Contracting Performance for Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints

Abstract

Public agencies often use contractors to facilitate Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) discrimination complaint cases, but we know relatively little about which factors influence contracting performance of the complaint process. Drawing on contracting theories, this study examines two factors—incentive structure and contractor ownership (i.e., women-owned and small disadvantaged-owned)—that moderate the link between agency contracting use and agency performance in the discrimination complaint process. Using the agency-level panel data from multiple sources, this study finds agency contracting use facilitates the discrimination complaint process when agencies use a performance-based incentive structure. When it comes to the moderating effect of contractor ownership focused on the socially/economically underrepresented, the findings show that using small disadvantaged-owned contractors positively moderates the relationship between contracting use and performance at the agency level.