Just War Theory

Abstract

Unlike the wide swath of ‘realists’ who claim Just War Theory (JWT) serves little purpose as political agents simply act from or only have an obligation to act from either their individual or group interests, this paper begins with the assumption that the development of the concepts, principles, and arguments of JWT can provide useful critical tools for attempting to place limits upon resorts to political violence. However, there is significant disagreement within contemporary JWT as to how the field ought to focus its critical endeavour. This paper will consider two sources of such disagreement and attempt some recommendations. The first controversy is over the relevance of ideal theory within JWT. Some just war theorists seek moral truths about war and its justifications under ideal circumstances, e.g. when citizens and military personnel are fully informed about the reasons for entering war or when combatants can detect the moral culpability of their opposition and their citizens. In contrast, a pragmatic JWT acknowledges that war creates special circumstances wherein one cannot always apply such ideal moral truths. The second and somewhat overlapping controversy is concerned with the moral responsibility for war and can be seen in three contrasting positions: 1) given that individuals do not declare war, JWT ought to provide critical principles for holding states responsible for these decisions; 2) since states have taken up JWT as mere rhetoric, JWT ought to hold citizens responsible for their state’s activities; and 3) since individuals are the proper locus of moral responsibility, JWT ought to hold individual soldiers responsible for determining their target’s liability to attack. The paper concludes by recommending a pragmatic JWT that shifts the focus to ask why a state has authority to command its citizens to fight and die on its behalf.