Abstract

Though peace and a new inclusive form of politics were promised, Museveni's Uganda has been plagued by a series of civil wars. This article explains the continuation of and propensity towards conflict by focusing on the country's ‘elite bargain’, defined as the distribution of positions of state power between contending social groups. Analysing Uganda's elite bargain in terms of political, economic, military, and territorial power sharing, the article argues that it has been only partially inclusive. Political, military, and economic power have remained ethnically biased in favour of groups from western and central Uganda, and this in turn has been a major driver of recurrent civil wars. Increased territorial power sharing since the late 1990s helps explain the recent decline in violent conflict, and may also help prevent new civil wars.

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