Abstract
In response to an Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation, it is often asked whether we could embed this impossibility result into judgment aggregation. I.e. preference-evaluation aggregation is a special case of judgment aggregation. We argue for this claim, after proving this result as a corollary of Dietrich’s (2015) work. We thereby provide a new proof of the impossibility result in preference-evaluation aggregation and clarify the relation between judgment and preference-evaluation aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model.
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