Joint Spectrum Allocation and Pricing for Cognitive Multi-Homing Networks

Abstract

In this paper, a spectrum pricing and allocation problem, based on hierarchical game theory framework, is studied for cognitive multi-homing networks. The spectrum pricing and allocation are subject to constraints in the required transmission rate for heterogeneous constant bit rate and variable bit rate services. A hierarchical game theory framework is designed based on a Stackelberg game. In the two-level game framework, primary network operators are leaders and determine the spectrum price, while cognitive mobile terminals (MTs) are followers and allocate the spectrum resource. Then, the spectrum allocation among secondary MTs is solved by a Bargaining game, and the spectrum price is set by a Bertrand game. To obtain the Nash equilibrium of hierarchical game theory framework, a joint spectrum pricing and allocation (JSPA) scheme is proposed in an iterative manner. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed JSPA not only raises the payoff for primary network operators, but also improves the quality of service for secondary MTs.