Abstract
In 1940, Japan's wealth, estimated in terms of national income, may be said to have been roughly one-tenth of that of the United States, and yet Japanese military power—the number of aircraft and warships in the Pacific—surpassed that of America. Japan had a well-defined strategy, albeit a disastrous one, for conquering Asia in order to establish a more self-sufficient empire. Today, fifty years later, Japan has caught up with the United States in economic indicators, but it spends far less than the latter on defense, and it cannot be said to have developed more than a rudimentary notion of defense strategy. This article contrasts these two periods in recent Japanese history and discusses possible factors for this dramatic reversal. It argues that defense strategies must be seen as conscious choices by a country's leaders; who they are and how they perceive international affairs are of crucial importance.
Published Version
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