James Raymond Vreeland and Axel Dreher (eds.): The political economy of the United Nations Security Council: money and influence

Abstract

Does money buy political support? This question is common in general discourse about domestic policy matters. Political conservatives accuse progressives of being beholden to labor unions while political progressives complain that big business sways conservatives. While the scholarly literature disagrees about the effect money has in influencing political outcomes, the rent seeking literature shows that money can be traded for political support. This type of trading, however, does not have to be confined to interest groups and politicians in a domestic policy setting. Trades can also occur between different countries who have different needs or preferences. The politics of the United Nations provides a perfect setting for this type of behavior. In The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council James Vreeland and Axel Dreher examine whether there are financial perks to serving on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The authors find that certain key countries, particularly Germany, Japan, and the United States, trade development aid for the votes of temporary members of the UNSC. These trades are common, especially in years with heightened international geopolitical dispute. Vreeland and Dreher argue that these trades occur for two basic reasons. First, wealthier countries care more about UNSC votes because international issues are normal goods and development aid is a relatively small part of their overall budget. In general, the opposite is true for poorer countries. Less developed countries care more about development aid than about broad international issues. This is because development aid can provide these countries with a significant amount of addition resources, relative to their overall budgets. In addition, less developed countries often have a small role in influencing international issues.