Abstract
The aims of this paper are threefold. First, I want to explain away an apparent inconsistency that presents a challenge to both moral cognitivism and an impartial conception of moral reasons. Secondly, in drawing on Amartya Sen's concept of evaluator relativity to solve the problem, I want significantly to amend Sen's proposal. I will suggest that it runs together two different ideas, that its proper location is in the theory of practical reasoning, not the theory of value, and that it is illuminating to connect his analysis to wider discussions in metaphysics of perspectival and absolute representations. 1 Thirdly, I want to connect the account I present to recent investigations into the puzzling status of deontic constraints, with the aim of supporting Thomas Nagel's suggestion that there is an intimate connection between such constraints and the relation of agent and victim. The problem I want to discuss is the following. Could two moral agents be confronted with the same situation, acknowledge that the values in that situation are the same for both of them, but come to different 'all things considered' judgements about what they ought to do? Our first response must be that they cannot. An agent's reasons for action cannot be detached from the values that he or she judges a situation to exemplify. Values and reasons must stand in some relation of determination or supervenience, such that the
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
