Prudence and the desire theory of reasons

Abstract

Persons at least sometimes act in a manner which does not promote their own immediate interests but rather their own future interests. Correspondingly, it is at least sometimes true that they have reasons to act in this manner. Thus, any theory of practical reasons which is to be at all convincing must be able to supply some plausible explication of what it is to have a prudential reason. In recent years, theories of practical reasons which are grounded upon persons' present desires have come under fresh attack just because of a purported inability to provide such an explication. Hence, it has been claimed that a theory of practical reasons which seeks to understand what it is for a person to have a reason to do something in terms of the present desires of that person cannot be an adequate theory of practical reasons. Against such claims, I will argue that the problems which are sometimes thought to prevent the desire theory of practical reasons from generating an adequate account of prudential reasons can be overcome and that, thus, criticism of the desire theory on these grounds is unconvincing.