IV. The Rôle of Congress and Public Opinion in Formulating Foreign Policy

Abstract

There is a popular expectation in the United States that the peace settlement of the major United Nations will be as effectively and loyally executed by the United States as by Great Britain and Soviet Russia. This over-confidence of the American people in the prowess of their President is partly due to: (1) the successful conduct of the war, (2) the popular credence placed in the Chief Executive as national leader in time of war, (3) the immense personal prestige of President Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and (4) the belief that, in case the November election should bring the Republican party into control of the White House, Governor Dewey would continue with vigor the Rooseveltian policy of full participation and leadership on the part of the United States.A warning that the American Senate might shatter this peace settlement was sounded by Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Robert A. Taft and other somewhat isolation-minded Republicans in September, 1943, in the Mackinac Declaration. The “constitutionalism” proposed by this declaration meant nothing else than that the peace settlement must be in the form of a treaty which would require the consent of two-thirds of the members of the American Senate. Senators Vandenberg and Taft controlled the resolutions committee of the Republican national convention in July, 1944, with the result that the Republican platform concluded its proposal regarding the peace settlement with the following pronouncement: “Pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, any treaty or agreement to attain such [international] aims made on behalf of the United States with any other nation or association of nations, shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”