Lloyd George and the Copenhagen Conference of 1919–1920: the Initiation of Anglo-Soviet Negotiations

Abstract

On I 2 February I920, James O'Grady and Maxim Litvinov signed an agreement at Copenhagen for an exchange of prisoners between Great Britain and Soviet Russia. It was the first formal agreement to be concluded by the two and, since its signing, has been viewed within the larger context of the restoration of Anglo-Soviet relations.' No one, however, has explained how this accord opened the way to the more comprehensive negotiations which followed. Nor has anyone explained the role of David Lloyd George in the negotiations. This study will examine that role and attempt to establish more exactly the way in which the Copenhagen negotiations contributed to the slow process of restoring Anglo-Soviet relations. Sources for this study are not as rich as might be imagined. Richard Ullman attributes this to the strength of the 'impulses to achieve the exchange of prisoners'; they were so strong that they stifled 'the complaint that the negotiations might imply de-facto recognition of the Soviet government '.2 As will be shown this is incorrect, for objections were raised for exactly this reason. They received little expression, however, because Lloyd George repeatedly denied that they had any foundation. These denials served his purpose but not that of the historian. His policy, as Harold Nicholson has observed, 'was impenetrably closed '. What was this policy? It was one of nearly consistent opposition to British intervention in the Russian civil war. That intervention ran counter to virtually all of his basic assumptions regarding the conduct of British foreign policy.4 Moreover, he believed intervention would fail. Even if the revolution could be crushed he