Israel and the Arab Peace Initiative, 2002–2014: A Plausible Missed Opportunity

Abstract

This article analyzes the Israeli position toward the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was adopted by the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut. The API has been the most dramatic and progressive Arab initiative ever presented Israel, and has remained on the negotiating table ever since it was first proposed. Unwilling recognize the magnitude of the change in the Arab position, succeeding Israeli governments have never officially responded the initiative for various reasons. The main argument of the article is that by constantly evading the API, Israel has missed a genuine opportunity advance the peace process.The Arab League Summit in Beirut on March 27/28, 2002, adopted an initiative resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab Peace Initiative (Mubadarat al-Salam al- Arabiyya), as it soon became known, was a modified version of a Saudi initiative, and was first unveiled in an interview of Crown Prince 'Abdullah of Saudi Arabia by Ameri- can journalist Thomas Friedman, on February 17 of that year. Israel learned of the API at the height of the second Palestinian uprising, the al-Aqsa Intifada, and therefore it did not elicit a serious response. However, it remained on the Arab League agenda ever since, regularly reaffirmed by successive league summits. In other words, the API has been an available policy option for more than a decade, yet no Israeli government has embraced it as a viable peace option.The aim of this article is analyze Israel's response (or lack thereof) the API. It will address the question of why Israeli decision-makers have continuously evaded this proposal, all the while declaring their support for making peace with the Arabs in general and with the Palestinians in particular. Though the API marked a major change in the Arab position toward Israel, academic research has not reflected its significance. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Israel is the addressee of the API, the question of whether it has represented a serious peace option for Israel has not been studied ad- equately. This article aims explore whether Israel, by failing seriously address the API, has missed a historic opportunity advance a peaceful solution the conflict.1The term plausible missed opportunity is defined as a situation in which one party a conflict or a third party offers an attractive, meaningful political alternative the status quo, which embodies an option for resolving the conflict or moving towards that end, but this alternative is not pursued for various reasons.2 The degree of missed op- portunity will be measured according four variables: the leaders' legitimacy, their determination pursue the peace track, the degree of trust existing between the parties based on previous contacts, and the extent of third-party involvement.3LAUNCHING THE APIIn February 2001, Ariel Sharon, the leader of the right-wing Likud party, was elected Israeli prime minister. His first priority was seek an immediate end the al-Aqsa Inti- fada that had been raging since September 2000, following the failure of the talks at the Camp David Summit in July of that year. The United States, which in the past attempted mediate negotiations, was also focused in 2001/2 on finding an acceptable political formu- la for ending the violence. All these efforts, however, failed.4 In light of the ongoing fight- ing, Crown Prince 'Abdullah of Saudi Arabia's peace overture caught many by surprise.On February 17, 2002, in an interview with Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, Crown Prince 'Abdullah proposed a new idea: full Israeli withdrawal from all the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, in accordance with United Nations reso- lutions, for full normalization of relations between Israel and the 22 Arab League states. The Crown Prince, who had been Saudi regent since 1995, said that his aim was to find a way make it clear the Israeli people that the Arabs don't reject or despise them. …