Is there any theoretical justification for a nonstatement view of theories?

Abstract

There are three fundamental components in the methodology of theory reconstruction associated with what has become known as the structuralist account of empirical theories. The first of these is an insistence upon axiomatization by means of a set-theoretic predicate; the second may be identified with the formal apparatus for describing the logical structure and empirical content of theories, as developed by J. D. Sneed and his collaborators. The third position, forcefully argued by Wolfgang Stegm?ller is roughly the view that any attempt to explicate important concepts within the general philosophy of science under the 'traditional' construal of theories as classes of statements is bound to lead to an inadequate, oversimplified or unworkable picture of science.1 In contrast to the numerous drawbacks he discerns within the standard or 'received' account of theories, Stegm?ller maintains for his "nonstatement view" that it is simpler to handle, is richer and more flexible, leads to greater differentiations and constitutes a logic ally and empirically better representation of the claims made by scientists in their theorizing. Both the 'structure' and 'dynamics' of theories (the latter comprising in particular a systematic recon strual of Kuhn's and Lakatos's accounts of scientific change) are thus held to be more perspicuously presented by means of the nonstatement view. Stegm?ller has developed and elaborated the structuralist account of science in his book The Structure and Dynamics of Theories as well as in numerous articles and research papers. More recently, and partly in response to Feyerabend's review of The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, he has set out to clarify and contrast the statement/nonstatement views and present the most systematic sur vey and defence of the structuralist approach to date; the results are published in The Structuralist View of Theories.