Ruetsche on the pristine and adulterated in quantum field theory

Abstract

It might seem that philosophy of science has fallen on hard times. When not being pilloried by famous scientists, philosophy of science receives scant attention from the educated public. This is not to say that work in philosophy of science is not flourishing; but surely what is flourishing most—in terms of number of jobs, number of publications, etc.—is the philosophy of the specific sciences, such as physics and biology. So does ‘‘general philosophy of science’’ have a future? Will that subject cease to exist, to be completely replaced by philosophical investigation of the specific sciences? Judging by its title, Laura Ruetsche’s book Interpreting Quantum Theories would seem to confirm the trend toward fragmentation in philosophy of science. And indeed, the book does discuss quantum theory in great detail and depth; it would certainly make for difficult reading for somebody with no college-level training in physics. But if you thought that Ruetsche’s book adds another nail to the coffin of general philosophy of science, then you thought wrong. Ruetsche’s book is set apart from many of the recent books of the philosophy of physics, not only in its engagement with the quantum theory of infinite systems (including quantum field theory), but also in its explicit engagement with questions from general philosophy of science. In fact, while Ruetsche does much to advance our understanding of the quantum theory of infinite systems, her challenge to the ‘‘received view’’ of what it means to interpret a scientific theory will be of interest to anyone working in any subfield of philosophy of science. The claim that general philosophy of science has something to say for foundational work in the particular sciences was defended by Larry Sklar in his book Theory and Truth. Similarly, philosophers such as Arthur Fine and Bas van Fraassen have argued that work on the foundations of physics bears directly on the big questions in general philosophy of science (e.g., realism vs. antirealism).