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Abstract
Sarsilabilirlik kuramlari makul bir bilgi tanimina ulasabilmek icin hatali gerekcelendirmelere dayali dogru inanclari eleme stratejisini guder. Farkli felsefeciler kendilerine ozgu sarsilabilirlik anlayislari gelistirmistir. Sarsilmaz gerekcelendirmeler hicbir zaman yanlis inanclarin dayanagi olmadigindan Zagzebski (1994) kati sarsilabilirlik sartinin inancin dogrulugu ile gerekcelendirilmesi arasindaki bagimsizligi ortadan kaldirdigini ifade eder. Bunu takiben, Zagzebski ve yine benzer gorusleri savunan bazi felsefeciler (or. Merricks, 1995) sarsilmaz gerekcelendirmenin zorunlu olarak dogrulugu beraberinde getirdigi sonucuna varir. Bu makalede, sarsilmaz gerekcelendirmelerin her zaman dogru inanca ulasmamasi durumuna ornek gostererek, dogruluk kosulunun luzumsuz olmadigini iddia ediyorum. Iddiama gore metafizik sorulara (ornegin: Tanri var midir?) iliskin inanclar sarsilmaz gerekcelendirmelere sahip olabilirler. Buna ragmen soz konusu gerekcelendirmeler destekledikleri inanclara dogruluk atfedemez.
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