Abstract
Abstract For the Platonist tradition there is a problem, as briefely mentioned in chapter two, of whether the true self is individual. The problem starts with Plato ;s belief that the true self is the rational soul or the intellect. Many people tend to think of intellect as a less distinctively individual part of their psychology, although it may seem more distinctive to philosophers, whose profession is intellectual discussion. As regards soul, Plato himself speaks as if all soul is one, indivisible except amongst bodies (Timaeus 35A 1– 6). And we shall see that Plotinus and Themistius think it even clearer that all intellect is one and indivisible.
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