Abstract
Abstract Throughout the Platonic tradition, one encounters the idea that the true self of each person is, at bottom, numerically identical to a singular reality and hence that the distinction between one person’s true self and another’s is either illusory or derivative in some way. I label this idea the Strong Identity Thesis. While several passages might be cited to locate this thesis in the Platonic dialogues themselves, the striking culmination of the First Alcibiades is especially suggestive. In this paper, however, I argue that this passage does not in fact support the attribution of the Strong Identity Thesis to Plato. Instead, I will argue for the Weak Identity Thesis: namely that there is merely an analogical or qualitative link between the true self and some ultimate reality.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
