Abstract

PurposeCompanies avoid taxes in a variety of ways and use different methods to do that, one of the most common being earnings management. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether companies manipulate their financial data in order to reduce taxes paid.Design/methodology/approachWe considered a sample of 63 listed Romanian companies for the period 2016–2021. The Beneish model was used for estimating earnings management, and the effective tax rate was used to measure tax avoidance. The analysis was carried out using regression analysis in Stata13 software.FindingsThe findings of the research indicate a negative and statistically significant association between effective tax rate and earnings management, implying that one of the main reasons why companies manipulate their earnings to reduce tax burden and avoid taxes. Moreover, our results show that return on assets (ROA) has a statistically significant negative influence on the effective tax rate. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that firm size, growth, and Big4 audit have no effect on effective tax rate.Research limitations/implicationsBecause it analyzes concrete cases using financial data and provides some recommendations for addressing the issue of tax avoidance, this work is useful in advancing both quantitative and qualitative research on this topic. This research is relevant for businesses, governments, regulators, audit professionals and investors.Originality/valueThe study, by analyzing concrete cases using reported financial data, contributes in filling the gap within the literature that results from a lack of scientific research on the relationship between tax avoidance and earnings management, and then it clarifies the nature of the causal connection between them. Moreover, it considers a combination of firm related variables including performance, size and also audit quality.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call