Is Pacifism Consistent?

Abstract

MR. M. JAY WHITMAN1 endeavors show, as against an argument advanced by me (and, it turns out, Immanuel Kant) ,2 that pacifism, while it may be wrong, is nevertheless not self-contradictory. In this, I believe, Whitman reflects the majority view, for most people whom I have canvassed on the subject find the doctrine bizarre and vaguely ludicrous, but nevertheless not unintelligible. No doubt I suffer from the philosopher's urge shove every doctrine unwelcome him into the outer darkness of irrationality, and I concede that such people ought be watched. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that Whitman has left pacifism with even a tenuous lease on life, for reasons which are worth going into. Whitman contends that the pacifist is saved by his use of a rule, which he spells out as follows: pacifist is one who believes we are under the strictest of moral obligations never employ physical force. The pacifist will maintain that physical force of any species will always substantive evils, and that our one supreme moral obligation is the negative part of the principle of benevolence (i.e., we ought never do evil). The pacifist position, in other words, is 'evil ought never be done, the heavens fall ' (307). Unfortunately, this formulation is crucially ambiguous. The first question is, what does the pacifist mean by lead to in the second sentence quoted? As I pointed out (p. 263), if by this is meant causes, which is the normal sense of the phrase, then this is not the sort of position which can be maintained a priori. That physical force will always a certain result could conceivably be true, but we can't be sure without empirical investigation. In this sense of lead to, then, a pacifism so expressed would be not at all self-contradictory, though it would be an irrational article of faith. Thus, the which Whitman talks about must be understood in quite a different way. But is this different way expressible in the words ought never be done, 'though the heavens fall' ? It seems me that it cannot. For if any sort of thing-for example, the employment of physical force-is held be the supreme kind of evil, then we must be sure include plenty of this particular commodity in the heavens when we make them fall. Now, hold that I ought not use physical force in order avoid any other evil than the occurrence of physical force would not be self-contradictory and would be what Whitman wants, namely, the use of a priority rule. However, as I was trying make clear in my paper, but evidently did not, no use of a priority rule as suck can escape the kind of contradiction I was claiming the pacifist is committed to. It seems me logically true, on any moral theory whatever, that the lesser evil must be preferred the greater. If the use of physical force by me, now, is necessary avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then say that physical force is the supreme (kind of) evil is precisely say that under these circumstances I am committed the use of physical force. It is irrelevant maintain that the use of physical force can never prevent the use of physical force -that is, that this means can never bring about that end-for that is a distinct issue (and, as I said, not one which can be settled a priori). It is, of course, also wildly implausible in the world as we know it. It is also irrelevant go into a disquisition on the subject of the principle of nonmaleficence as opposed supposed other principles of justice, such as contract. None