Is Missile Defence Moral?

Abstract

INTRODUCTIONOn 17 December 2002, President George W. Bush announced his intention to deploy a missile defence system capable of destroying incoming ballistic weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), thereby sparking in Canada another agonizing debate about our role in this initiative.This debate culminated in Prime Minister Martin's March 2005 decision to have Canada not participate in missile defence. There is no need to reflect on the domestic reasons that are the source of this refusal; our American neighbours understand that Martin's administration had been moving towards a rapprochement with Washington since Chretien's departure, and that his decision is not based on any animosity.Martin's decision is grounded in the logic of political survival, not on the merits or demerits of missile defence per se. Those who lament his decision will say that Canada is losing a at the table, although the value and the weight of our sitting anywhere can be debated. Others, such as officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs, may regret not being able to consolidate claims for more open access to American government defence and research contracts for Canadian firms (as per NAFTA rules), although there is no guarantee that participation in missile defence would help our bargaining position on any trade issue with the US. Yet others may be relieved that Canada's reputation will not be soiled by participation in what they see as a dangerous scheme, although our continued role in NORAD amounts to de facto participation.But what the latter may not realize is that not being at the table hinders Canada in pressing for its underlying interests to be recognized, namely, comprehensive nuclear disarmament and the non-weaponization of space. Should another opportunity to retake our seat occur, perhaps the domestic realities of Canadian politics could be reconciled with the new strategic realities and the opportunities they offer as expressed in the following argument. This is an attempt to demonstrate the conditions under which a defensive transition through missile defence deployment can trigger a reduction in nuclear stockpiles. It is an essay about strategic philosophy and morality, a mental experience whose hypothesis is difficult to verify. The hypothesis is that BMD can reconcile a defensive transition with disarmament, making such systems moral weapons.This article is not about the history of nuclear strategy. It is about strategic thinking as it is modified by the double impact of defensive systems and the application of a positivist praxis in international relations. The demonstration proceeds with a definition of morality or ethics in relation to nuclear weapons. The notion of morality, as defined, is set against a brief survey of the positions that emerged for and against missile defence in the two periods identified below (1983-86 and 1998-2002).The sources used for this paper were drawn from a thorough analysis of the literature. This revealed that the most sustained debate about BMD for both periods was articulated by Keith Payne and Colin Gray in Comparative Strategy. Other views on the subject were also commonplace in earlier issues of the CII A's International Journal and in the Council on Foreign Relations' Foreign Affairs. The predominance of those sources reflects the direction of a debate that has yet to be concluded, and its impact on Canada's strategic position vis-a-vis the US.The point of departure for this article is that the conditions that lead to a positivist or constructivist assessment of national security are borne out of the collapse of the superpower confrontation, and that this development can more easily bring about the deployment of missile defence, which, to be effective, must take into account new threats and a reasonable chance of success of defeating them.I MORALITY AND NUCLEAR WARMichael Walzer suggests that [n]uclear war is and will remain morally unacceptable, and there is no case for its rehabilitation. …