Is Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Inconsistent?

Abstract

There is an important conundrum at the heart of Locke's theory of knowledge. On the one hand, Locke defines knowledge as nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas (E IV.i.l: 525). Thus, as Locke sees it, can have Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas (E IV.iii.l: 538). On the other hand, Locke takes there to be a kind of knowledge he calls sensitive, which is employ'd about the particular existence of finite Beings without us (E IV.ii.14: 537), from which it appears to follow that we can have knowledge farther than we have ideas. The inconsistency seems blatant: if Locke's official definition of knowledge is correct, then sensitive knowledge is impossible; and if sensitive knowledge is possible, then Locke's official definition of knowledge must fall. The importance of the conundrum lies in the fact that solving it is essential to a proper understanding of Locke's attitude toward external world skepticism. In various places, Locke severely criticizes and ridicules the external world skeptic, along with the arguments (such as the dream argument) on which such skepticism is founded (E IV.ii.14: 537, IV.xi.1-9: 630-636). As he puts it: I think no body can, in earnest, be so skeptical, as to be uncertain of the Existence of Things which he sees and feels (E IV.xi.3: 631). And yet, given his official definition of knowledge and his consequent admission that knowledge is limited to the realm of mind-dependent ideas, it appears that Locke's anti-skeptical stance is completely unjustified. Some Locke scholars have despaired of finding a solution to the conundrum.1 To them, this is yet one more example of those